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The EU increasingly uses diversified (new) governance mechanisms in order to 
improve its performance and legitimacy. In tax matters, various kinds of soft law 
are used, in indirect as well as in direct taxation. One such instrument, the Code 
of Conduct for Business Taxation, is deployed to tackle harmful tax competition 
with respect to direct taxation. Though legally non-binding but relying on peer 
pressure for its effectiveness, the Code of Conduct is generally regarded to be 
quite an effective political instrument. There is a subtle interplay between the 
Code of Conduct and existing hard law in the EU, the State aid provisions 
providing an important stick, and also between the Code and OECD’s soft law 
instruments. Though the Code’s effectiveness is limited, producing negative 
integration only, it still is significant in facilitating an ongoing dialogue on 
harmful tax competition between the Member States. However, the Code of 
Conduct does not score well in terms of stakeholders involvement. The Member 
States are involved, not civil society. More inclusive and transparent public 
participation and consultation may enhance the responsiveness and legitimacy of 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1990s, soft law has become a rather popular regulatory device. The 
main reason for this popularity seems to be the shift to new governance in public 
administration and the growing importance of horizontal networks in the context 
of international and transnational organizations. In this respect, soft law is 
generally considered to be an important instrument to enhance the legitimacy and 
responsiveness of policy-making and regulation.  
 In a previous article in this journal, I have analysed governance aspects of two 
forms of regulation by the Dutch tax administration, more specifically: law made 
by way of administrative policy rules and, with regard to its law enforcement 
task, by way of the recently introduced horizontal supervision approach.2 Both 
forms of soft law, policy rules and enforcement covenants are related to a change 
in thinking about governance and corporate governance. These changes resulted 
in shifting attitudes, on the one hand, of the Dutch tax administration towards 
taxpayers and, on the other hand, of multinational corporations towards tax 
compliance. 
 In this second part of this diptych on soft law, I will now elaborate on the 
European and international use of soft law in taxation matters, such as the EU 
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, and the OECD model tax treaty 
convention and transfer pricing guidelines. In this article, I will try to assess the 
use of soft law in European tax law in the broader perspective of soft law being 
used as an alternative to more formal measures such as regulations, decisions, and 
directives. There are many forms of EU soft law, eg, communications, 
recommendations, guidelines, codes of conduct. Here, I will focus on the EU 
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation. What conception of governing and law-
making accounts for the use of soft law? To answer this question, some 
reflections on the notion of governance and soft law, as an alternative to European 
legislation, are necessary. I will continue by setting out the varieties of EU soft 
law and their complex relationship to hard law. Then, I will review the use of soft 
law instruments in the light of a communicative style of regulation. However, to 
prepare the ground, I will start and set out the main characteristics of tax law in 
the European Union and its relation to the EU’s fight against harmful tax 
competition. I will add some observations on the OECD’s soft law instruments to 
tackle this problem, harmful tax competition being a global phenomenon. The EU 
and OECD will prove to be brothers in arms on the harmful tax competition 
battlefield. 
 I will assess the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation as a soft law 
instrument to enhance tax coordination. I will argue that the communicative 
                              
2 H Gribnau, “Soft Law and Taxation: The Case of The Netherlands” (2007) 1 Legisprudence 
291-326. 
       Hans Gribnau 69
Legisprudence Vol II, No 2 
                            
quality of soft policy-making and regulation may be enhanced by involving 
stakeholders by way of public consultation and participation, the involvement of 
civil society being an essential condition for more responsive and legitimate EU 
tax coordination policies. 
B. EU MARKET INTEGRATION AND TAX LAW  
1. EU Market Integration 
Before analysing the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation and, more generally, 
the use of soft law in the context of European tax law, I will make a few remarks 
with regard to some salient characteristics of tax law in the European Union. 
Without any knowledge of these characteristics, it is hard to assess the use of soft 
law in European tax matters.  
 Taxation in the European Union is part of a larger picture. The Union has set 
itself several objectives, among which the objective “to promote economic and 
social progress” and “a high level of employment.” These objectives are to be 
realized through the creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion, and through the establishment of 
an economic and monetary union (see art 2 of the EC Treaty). This establishment 
of a common market and of an economic and monetary union is an important 
means to reach the integration of national economies, ie, market integration. More 
specifically, the common market includes the establishment of an internal market 
which is “characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles 
to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital” (art 3, para 1 (c), 
and 14, para 2 of the EC Treaty). 
 In order to achieve the objectives of article 2 of the EC Treaty, both the 
Member States and the Community are obliged to adopt “an economic policy 
which is based on the close coordination of Member States’ economic policies, on 
the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition”, 
thereby “favouring an efficient allocation of resources” (art 4, para 1, art 98 of the 
EC Treaty, respectively). This efficient allocation serves the goal of improving the 
welfare of the peoples of Europe by opening the internal borders to persons, 
goods, services and capital while setting competition rules which guarantee the 
free play of market forces. Nobody may interfere with this aim of an optimal 
allocation of resources. Thus both the internal market as a whole and the 
respective national markets are committed to the principle of open competition.3 
                              
3 W Schön, “Tax Competition in Europe―The Legal Perspective” (2000) 9 EC Tax Review 91. 
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This open competition requires an internal market with free movement of goods, 
services, persons, and capital and a level playing field, ie, conditions of 
competition which are not distorted by specific tax measures or tax privileges.  
 The nexus between taxation and market integration is twofold. On the one 
hand, substantial differences between national tax laws may constitute important 
obstacles to the common market. Moreover, only a Europe capable of optimizing 
market conditions within the Common Market will be able to survive in the 
competition with the economies of Asia and the US. “Harmonization can thus 
also be necessary to survive in the international competition of tax systems.”4 On 
the other hand, provisions of a discriminatory and restrictive nature in national 
tax laws may constitute such obstacles, for example, because of their differential 
treatment of residents and non-residents. Thus, in the field of taxation market, 
integration may be achieved in a positive and in a negative way. Positive 
integration is achieved by tax harmonisation or at least coordination between 
Member States. This is integration by way of coordination of national policies, 
common policy-making, and approximation of national laws. Negative 
integration is integration through legally enforceable prohibitions on 
discriminatory measures and restrictive features of national tax systems; here, the 
case law of the EC Court of Justice (ECJ) is of major importance. However, non-
binding instruments, notably the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation, have 
been introduced, in addition to these legally enforceable instruments,. 
2. Indirect Taxes: Positive Integration  
Taxation may have distorting effects on the internal market, for tax differences 
may constitute impediments to the proper functioning of the internal market. In 
1957, at the moment of the constitution of the European Economic Community, 
solely the distorting effects of indirect taxes was envisaged. This is not a surprise 
since, among tax impediments, customs duties and discriminating domestic 
taxations of foreign good and services are the most conspicuous ones. They 
visibly and directly affect the freedom to trade.5  
 As for indirect taxes, the EEC treaty already contained an explicit instruction 
to the Community’s legislator to harmonise indirect taxes to the extent necessary 
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market (now art 93 of the EC 
Treaty). Consequently, the Community adopted an abundance of secondary law in 
the field of indirect taxes. The EEC treaty contained provisions with regard to a 
customs union (art 23 of the EC Treaty), and a specific harmonisation and non-
discrimination provision for customs duties and turnover taxes (art 90 of the EC 
                              
4 Ibid, 105. Thus, competition in tax laws is a species of competition in laws, one important 
aspect of globalisation.  
5 B J M Terra and P Wattel, European Tax Law (Deventer, Kluwer, 2007), 91. 
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Treaty). Article 23 of the EC Treaty states that the Community is based upon a 
customs union, which means the total prohibition of customs duties between 
Member States on import and export and of equivalent border-crossing charges 
(art 25 of the EC Treaty). This customs union also entails a common customs 
tariff in their relation with third countries. In the years 1992-1993, the far-
reaching Community Customs Code, Regulation (EEC) 2913/92 and the 
implementing code, Regulation (EEC) 2454/93, were introduced.6 As for 
customs, article 90 of the EC Treaty is also relevant: discriminatory and 
protective taxes are forbidden. Consequently, this article leaves the Member 
States discretion to levy product taxes within certain limits. 
 With regard to indirect taxes, specific harmonisation and non-discrimination 
provisions are to be found in the already mentioned article 90 and in articles 91-
93 of the EC Treaty.7 The legal basis for the harmonisation of indirect taxes, ie, 
turnover taxes and excise duties, is article 93. To reach the goal of the 
harmonisation in so far as necessary for the establishment and the functioning of 
the internal market, the necessary powers are conferred on the Community, 
according to this article.8 Turnover taxes have to be harmonised because Member 
States could use these as an escape, ie, a substitute for import and export duties.9 
The many directives on value added tax that have been issued limit or sometimes 
entirely discard national sovereignty as regards the system, the base, the 
exemptions, and the rates of turnover taxation. To name just one example, any 
other system of turnover taxation than value added taxation is excluded. The 
harmonisation of excise duties on the other hand is less advanced; so far, only 
those on alcohol, mineral oils, and tobacco have been affected. The Member 
States governments apparently insist on retaining as much of their tax sovereignty 
as possible. “Even the eminently rational abolition of duty-free shopping between 
EU countries took ten years to achieve and then with considerable oppositions 
from some of the larger EU countries.”10 This is a nice example of the more 
general phenomenon that governments are reluctant to take particular 
                              
6 For a discussion of the Community Customs Code, see ibid, 125-134. 
7 These taxes and duties partly provide the Community with its own resources, the most 
important of which are a percentage of the national bases of the value added tax, the revenue 
from customs duties at the outside borders of the EC, and agricultural levies. 
8 For empirical evidence of the importance of harmonisation of laws and regulations for 
enterprises, ie, private equity, see S Johan, The Law and Economics of Private Equity 
Financing: Empirical Essays (Tilburg, Tilburg University, 2007).  
9 Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 135-206, deals with value added tax in 
Europe (on the basis of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006, which replaces 
the Sixth VAT Directive). 
10 K Messere, F de Kam and C Heady, Tax Policy: Theory and Practice in OECD Countries 
(Oxford University Press, 2003), 221. 
   Soft Law and Taxation: EU and International Aspects 72
Legisprudence Vol II, No 2 
                            
coordinating, let alone harmonizing, decisions that would be unpopular in their 
own countries. 
3. Direct Taxes: Mainly Negative Integration 
Unlike indirect taxes, direct taxes are hardly referred to in the EC Treaty. 
Consequently, considerably few powers in the field of direct taxation are 
conferred on the Community. Compared to indirect taxes, therefore, the 
harmonization of direct taxes rests on a considerably narrower Treaty basis. Any 
attempt to harmonize direct taxes has to fall back on the general harmonization 
provisions (arts 94 and 95).11 However, the legal basis provided for by the 
general harmonization provisions is not as promising as it seems to be. Article 95, 
para 2 states that article 95, para 1, demanding qualified majority decisions on 
matters concerning the establishment and the functioning of the internal market, 
is not applicable in the field of direct taxation. Consequently, the legal basis in the 
EC Treaty for direct tax harmonisation is not very broad because the Member 
States are not prepared to confer any part of their sovereignty in matters of direct 
taxation. The remaining legal basis for harmonization of direct taxation, article 
94, deals with the approximation of domestic laws directly affecting the 
establishment or the functioning of the common market. Unanimous decision-
making is required, which gives Member States the power to veto EC measures in 
the field of direct taxation. This unanimity requirement is also to be found in 
article 93, on indirect taxes. As a result, direct and indirect tax measures can only 
be adopted unanimously.  
 Especially in the field of direct taxes, the unanimity requirement has been a 
serious impediment to harmonisation.12 States treasure their sovereignty in the 
field of taxation, because taxation is a fundamental sign of national sovereignty 
and because taxation nowadays is an important instrument to collect money for 
the treasury, to fund redistributive policies, and all kinds of other government 
policy goals. Therefore, the constraint on national sovereignty in indirect tax 
matters made the EU Member States all the more reluctant to yield their tax 
sovereignty in the other field of taxation, ie, direct taxation. Limited 
harmonisation is achieved by a few directives, eg, the Directive on the common 
system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of 
                              
11 Cf Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 10-11. 
12 Schön, “Tax Competition in Europe―The Legal Perspective”, supra, n 3, 104: “More than 
learned writings concerning the fundamental freedoms and more than any discussion about 
necessity and subsidiarity of approximation of laws or than the diverse economic contributions 
for and against tax harmonization, it has been this unanimity requirement which, in recent 
decades, has characterized the practice of European tax policy, has prevented harmonization and 
led to institutional competition in the tax area.”  
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different member states and the Directive on the common system of taxation 
applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares 
concerning companies of different member states.13 Furthermore, the 
Commission is currently working on two main comprehensive approaches to 
remove tax obstacles which companies face in the Internal Market: the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) and a possible pilot scheme for 
Home State Taxation for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (HST).14
 Consequently, far less positive integration having been achieved in direct 
taxation than in indirect taxation, the Member States remain free in principle to 
regulate direct taxation matters according to their own views. They may take 
policy decisions they deem to be necessary, with regard to the structure of their 
tax system. However, negative integration emerges here, for the national 
sovereignty of the Member States is restricted by negative integration. It is based 
on the EC Treaty provisions, especially the free movement rules (arts 23-31 and 
39-60). According to settled case law, although direct taxation falls within their 
competence, Member States must nonetheless exercise that competence 
consistently with Community law.15 Thus, the Member States may not enact or 
maintain direct tax laws or administrative practices which discriminate against or 
restrict enterprises, employees or capital of other Member States. According to 
these Treaty freedoms, the Member States must abstain from covert or overt 
discrimination by nationality. Beside these measures with distinction on the basis 
of nationality, measures without distinction, which nonetheless hinder or make 
less attractive the exercise of the Treaty Freedoms for cross-border economic 
activity, are also prohibited.16 Even so, they may not enact or maintain tax 
incentives which amount to aid to certain producers or sectors, as State aid 
distorts open market competition. 
 The EC Court of Justice has struck down many national regulations on the 
grounds of violation of the free movement rules.17 The tax case law has followed 
                              
 
13 Council Directive of 23 July 1990, 90/435/EEC, OJ L 225, 20.8.1990, 6 (Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive), and Council Directive of 23 July 1990, 90/434/EEC, OJ L 225, 20.8.1090, 1 (Merger 
Directive). See also the Interest and Royalty Directive  and the Interest Savings Directive.  
14 This policy was established in 2001 (COM(2001) 582, 23.10.2001) and confirmed in 2003 
(COM(2003) 726, 24.11.2003). 
15 See already ECJ 11 August  1995, Case C-80/94 Wielockx, para 16.   
16 Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 43-57. 
17 Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 337-424. The ECJ has adopted a “much 
more robust concept of discrimination than that found in international tax and trade law (…), 
members states’ claims that a provision is necessary to maintain the coherence of their income 
taxes have generally been rejected by the court”; M Graetz and A C Warren, “Income Tax 
Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe”, in R S Avi-Jonah, J R 
Hines Jr, and M Lang (eds), Comparative Fiscal Federalism: Comparing the European Court of 
Justice and the US Supreme Courts’ Tax Jurisprudence (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
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a pattern similar to some other areas, balancing the Community’s interest in free 
movement with potentially conflicting national interests. This is no easy job for 
the Court, because, on the one hand, it is working in a largely unharmonized area 
on a case-by-case basis (eventually hearing enough cases to get a better feel for 
where the balance should lie) and, on the other hand, the treatment of a taxpayer 
in a cross-border situation depends on the interaction of more than one system, in 
some cases many more. Indeed, “there is nothing approaching the complex 
interaction of Member State rules that exists in the direct tax area.”18  
 Negative integration – constraining domestic direct tax policy – is also based 
on the competition rules, in particular, in the field of taxation, the ban on State aid 
to enterprises (arts 87-89). The EC Court of Justice has also struck down many 
national regulations which violated these State aid rules.19 The State aid regime is 
aimed to regulate the granting of financial support by Member States to 
enterprises. They could do this by means of a tax benefit, which may have similar 
effects as a state subsidy despite their different labels. National governments may 
thus pursue their own industrial policies using subsidies and other incentives to 
provide enterprises and entrepreneurs with a competitive advantage over similar 
enterprises in other Member States. Consequently, such financial support may 
keep inefficient enterprises in business, which is contrary to the goal of free 
competition in the common market, ie, survival of the most efficient producers of 
goods and services.20 According to the Court, the effects rather than the 
objectives of a state measure count.21 Tax measures, therefore, in principle 
constitute State aid if their effects favour certain enterprises or productions.22 Of 
 
 
International, 2007), 263-320, 279, 300. See also F Vanistendael (ed), EU Freedoms and 
Taxation (Amsterdam, IBFD, 2006). 
18 P Farmer, “Tax Law and Policy in an Adolescent European Union”, (2007) 2 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 42. He continues: “The closest―although not a complete analogy―is 
perhaps the social security area, but there, of course, we have a comprehensive set of 
Community coordinating provisions.” 
19 See C Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law (The Hague/London/New York, Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), 97-193. He concludes: “At the moment, the application of the fiscal State 
aid rules seems the, most effective tool to counter harmful tax competition in the EU.” See also 
D Wolf, “State Aid Control at the National, European and International Level”, in M Zürn and 
Ch Joerges (eds), Law and Governance in Postnational Europe: Compliance beyond the Nation-
State (Cambridge University Press 2005), 86: “The European regulatory controls on State aid 
must be considered to be one of its more or less silent success stories.” 
20 For the relationship between tax incentives and its economic background, see R H C Luja, 
Assessment And Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC and the WTO: A View on State Aids, Trade 
Subsidies and Direct Taxation (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003), 3-23. 
21 Case 173/73, Italy v Commission ECJ 2 July 1974. 
22 An example is the recent approval by the Commission of a French tax credit aimed at 
encouraging video game creation. This tax credit may be granted only to video games that meet 
the criteria of quality, originality, and contribution to cultural diversity. After an in-depth 
investigation that began in 2006, the Commission concluded that this measure qualified for the 
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course, scrutinizing particular tax benefits is nothing like harmonizing the tax 
systems of the states, since this does not affect the core of the national tax 
systems. Note that, like taxation, State aid is at the heart of state sovereignty, and 
therefore an extremely politicized EU policy area.23
 As will be shown below, important negative integration was achieved through 
soft law, ie, the adoption of the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation. However, 
before elaborating on the phenomenon of soft law, I will briefly deal with tax 
competition and the concept of harmful tax competition which lies at the basis of 
the introduction of the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation. The Code is a soft 
law instrument to tackle harmful tax competition, and therefore to enhance 
negative integration of the corporate income tax laws of the Member States.  
C. HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION 
1. The European Union 
The basic assumption underlying the idea of competition on a free and open 
market is the most efficient production of goods and services for the benefit of the 
consumers. The removal of all kind of barriers, such as technical, physical, 
administrative and cultural barriers, makes it easier to set up many economic 
activities in Member States which are thought most attractive. In an age of 
increasing mobility of undertakings and especially capital investments, 
companies and entrepreneurs consider low tax costs an important factor in 
deciding where to set up undertakings and invest capital. States are aware of this, 
of course, and they will try to compete with their tax system in order to attract 
economic activities from other Member States or from third countries.24 Member 
States see corporation tax as an important instrument in this bid for economic 
 
exemption provided for by the EC Treaty for state aid to promote culture; IP/07/1908, 
12.12.2007. 
23 The State aid policy area “pits the Commission directly against the member states, with 
governmental authorities rather than firms, targets of Commission regulation”; M Cini, “The 
Soft Law Approach: Commission Rule-Making in the EU’s State Aid Regime” (2001) 8 Journal 
of European Public Policy 198. 
24 For an analysis of the concept, methodology, and economic aspects of tax competition, see 
Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law, supra, n 19, 1-52. Though business may profit from low 
tax costs as a result of tax competition, tax competition may seriously complicate national tax 
systems and therefore lead to higher compliance costs for multinational corporations. Disparate 
tax systems can create obstacles to cross-border economic activities. Therefore, businesses 
operating in the internal market will mostly have a preference for tax coordination aimed at the 
elimination of tax obstacles.  
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activity, for example, lower corporate taxes might induce multinational 
corporations not to allocate their profits to other countries.25
 This tax competition may force national governments to search for an optimal 
mix of public goods and services, on the one hand, and low tax costs, on the 
other. If economic opportunities and activities are created the internal market will 
flourish. “Such policy competition between overall national tax systems, leading 
to budgetary and tax efficiency, is in principle good for everyone”, Terra and 
Wattel argue.26 However, this tax competition may also be economically 
counterproductive. The forms and features of tax incentives which the sovereign 
states commonly use in order to attract investment and capital from abroad can 
often have harmful effects. Such special tax schemes as tax holidays, selective 
base or rate reductions, and tax breaks may be designed solely to undercut 
competition. However, such harmful tax competition has little to do with tax 
efficiency and healthy jurisdictional competition, and it leads to “fiscal 
degradation” ,27 unfair tax advantages for multinational corporations over smaller 
local enterprises, overtaxation of labour, and a radical reduction of public goods 
and services and negative consequences for distributive justice.28 Tax competition 
is commonly labelled harmful when Member States merely damage each other’s 
budget, no creation of economic activity being at issue, but rather “artificial 
cross-border shifts of activities (or at least profit-reporting for those activities), 
causing a tax loss for the EC as a whole.”29 It should be noted, however, that 
there is no scientific consensus on the theoretical definition of harmful tax 
competition and that even “empirical evidence is somewhat disputed by both 
economists and political scientists.”30
 In the 1990s, harmful tax competition became a hotly debated topic in the 
European Union. I will briefly deal with a few moments in this debate to point out 
the growing sense of urgency to fight harmful tax competition and the subsequent 
choice for a soft law instrument in the form of the Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation. 
                              
25 For a view on the political dimension of corporation tax issues, see J Snape, “Corporation Tax 
Reform―Politics and Public Law” (2007) 103 British Tax Review, 382-89. 
26 Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 110. Cf F Vanistendael, “Fiscal Support 
Measures and Harmful Tax Competition” (2000) 9 EC Tax Review 152-61. 
27 Fiscal degradation is “the loss of tax revenue borne by countries engaged in the lowering of 
taxes on income derived from inbound investment or, in other words, the excessive erosion of 
their taxable bases on such income”; Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law, supra, n 19, 11. 
28 A J Menéndez, “The Purse of the Polity”, in E O Eriksen (ed), Making the European Polity: 
Reflexive Integration in the EU (London, Routledge, 2005), 208. He points to “the connection 
between corporate taxation and distributive justice (tax dumping leads to social dumping).” 
29 Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 111. 
30 C M Radaelli, “The Code of Conduct against Harmful Tax Competition: Open Method of 
Coordination in Disguise?” (2003) 81 Public Administration 522. 
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 The Ruding Report of 1992, commissioned by the EC Commission and 
named after its chairman, was the outcome of a two-year study carried out by a 
committee of tax experts.31 This report contains a comprehensive study on 
corporate taxation in the EU, pointing out considerable differences between the 
national laws of the Member States that have distorting effects.32 The findings 
were followed by a number of policy recommendations regarding, on the one 
hand, the elimination of the double taxation of cross-border income flows, and, 
on the other, the approximation of corporation taxes. One of the recommendations 
was the alignment of the domestic rules of the EU Member States with the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines (see infra, section C.2).  
 The next important step was the Monti Memorandum, named after Mr. Mario 
Monti the EC Commissioner for the internal market.33 By publishing this 
“discussion paper” in 1996, the Commission for the first time put the distorting 
effects of tax competition high on the political agenda.34 The memorandum 
created a sense of urgency to increase the coordination of the tax policies of the 
Member States. In a subsequent report, the Commission stressed the need to curb 
unfair tax competition by applying the State aid rules more strictly and also the 
need to enhance coordination in the area of tax incentives granted by the Member 
States in order to reduce the negative effects of tax competition.35 To achieve this 
aim, a group of high representatives of Member States had to be involved to 
discuss the relevant issues and achieve consensus on the tax measures to be 
considered harmful in the Community context. This group was to formulate 
common criteria to identify such measures to be laid down into a code of good 
conduct. 
 Also interesting is the Commission’s view set out in the already mentioned 
Communication, “Tax Policy in the European Union - Priorities for the Years 
Ahead.”36 In this Communication, it is stated that the Community must, in 
                              
31 Schön, “Tax Competition in Europe―The Legal Perspective”, supra, n 3, 95. He points out 
that the “Neumark report”, presented by the Fiscal and Financial Committee in 1962, already 
emphasized the necessity of abolishing those differences between the Member States of tax 
incentives or expenditure policies, whose mere existence induces enterprises, and consequently 
also capital and labour, to choose other locations than those which would be the most favourable 
ones from a natural-technical point of view.” 
32 Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, March 1992 (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities 1992).  
33 Discussion paper for the international meeting of Ecofin Ministers, SEC(96) 487 final, 
20.3.1996. 
34 For a review of some other studies, see Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law, supra, n 19, 37-
41. 
35 Taxation in the European Union: Report on the Development of Tax Systems, COM(1996) 
546 final, 22.10.1996. 
36 COM (2001) 260 final, 23.5.2001, 10 and 22-24. 
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addition to continuing the important fight against harmful tax competition, ensure 
that tax policy is in line with the Lisbon goals. The Commission sets out some 
general objectives for a future tax policy at Community level. As regards the 
instruments for achieving these objectives, the Commission also points to non-
legislative approaches or “soft legislation” in addition to (hard) legislation, in 
order to achieve (negative) integration in the field of direct taxation. The peer 
pressure, which is the basis of the Code of Conduct, could be applied to other 
areas. 
 In October 2001, the Commission released its report “Company Taxation in 
the Internal Market.”37 With regard to tax competition, this study is cautious in 
drawing conclusions, but points to the lack of harmonisation in the internal 
market. It is suggested that, given this lack, harmful tax competition occurs, if 
Member States use direct taxation as an effective competition tool to attract 
foreign investment. The study concludes, on the one hand, that tax competition 
has certain positive welfare implications for the EU, and, on the other hand, that 
special tax incentives and preferential tax regimes must be curtailed to prevent 
harmful effects on the internal market.38
 In the next section, a twofold link will be shown between EU and 
international soft law. Firstly, the EU and the OECD both use soft law in order to 
tackle harmful tax competition by way of the EU Code of Conduct on Business 
Taxation and the OECD model tax treaty convention and transfer pricing 
guidelines, respectively. Secondly, the EU Code of Conduct on Business Taxation 
explicitly endorses the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. 
2. The OECD 
The European Union is not the only organisation that wants to tackle harmful tax 
competition. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) is also an important player in this context. In the framework of this 
harmful tax competition the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which, as will be 
shown, are related to the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, play an 
important role. 
 In May 1996, the Ministers of the Member countries of the OECD called upon 
the OECD to “develop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax 
competition on investment and financing decisions and the consequences for 
                              
37 SEC (2001) 1661, 23.10.2001. The main findings of this comprehensive study and the 
consequent recommendations were included in a separate communication: Commission 
communication, Towards an Internal Market without Tax Obstacles – A Strategy for Providing 
Compliance with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for their EU-wide Activities, COM(2001) 
582 final, 23.10.2001. 
38 SEC (2001) 1661. 
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national tax bases, and report back in 1998.”39 This request was subsequently 
endorsed by the G7 countries, who pointed to the fact that globalisation was 
creating new problems in the field of tax policy. Tax schemes aimed at attracting 
financial and other geographically mobile activities, such as financial and other 
service activities, “can create harmful tax competition between States, carrying 
risks of distorting trade and investment and could lead to the erosion of national 
tax bases.”40  
 In 1998, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs published a report on 
harmful tax competition. This report addressed tax havens and harmful 
preferential tax regimes, collectively referred to as harmful tax practices, in 
OECD Member countries and non-Member countries and their dependencies. The 
OECD report was intended to develop a better understanding of how these 
harmful tax practices “affect the location of financial and other service activities, 
erode the tax bases of other countries, distort trade and investment patterns and 
undermine the fairness, neutrality and broad social acceptance of tax systems 
generally. Such harmful tax competition diminishes global welfare and 
undermines taxpayer confidence in the integrity of tax systems.”41 Of course, 
countries may and usually do use a variety of counteracting measures, typically 
implemented through unilateral or bilateral action by the countries concerned. 
However, as the report convincingly argued, there are limits to such a unilateral 
or bilateral approach to “a problem that is essentially global in nature.”42 
Therefore, counteracting measures are likely to be most effective if undertaken in 
a co-ordinated way at the international level.43 International cooperation demands 
that governments establish a “common framework within which countries could 
operate individually and collectively to limit the problems presented by countries 
and fiscally sovereign territories engaging in harmful tax practices.”44
 With regards to soft law, it should be noted that Recommendation 6 in the 
report suggested that Member States follow the already existing OECD 
Guidelines of 1995 on transfer pricing when the arm’s length principle was 
implemented at the domestic level, thereby refraining from harmful tax 
competition. Transfer pricing or intercompany pricing is the area of tax law that is 
                              
39 Committee on Fiscal Affairs OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: A Global Issue (Paris, OECD, 
1998), 8. 
40 Communiqué issued by the Heads of State at their 1996 Lyon Summit, quoted in OECD, 
Harmful Tax Competition, supra, n, 39, 8.  
41 Ibid, 9. 
42 Ibid, 37. 
43 The EU Code and the OECD Guidelines are broadly compatible, particularly as regards the 
criteria used to identify harmful preferential tax regimes, and mutually reinforcing. However, 
the scope and operation of the two differ, partially because of the different institutional 
frameworks. For more details, see ibid, 11. 
44 Ibid, 8. 
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concerned with ensuring that prices charged between associated enterprises for 
the transfer of goods, services, and intangible property are in accordance with the 
arm’s length principle. This principle deals with transactions, among associated 
enterprises, so-called “controlled transactions”, which are not like transactions 
between independent enterprises determined by market forces, whereby these 
enterprises may seek to manipulate their profits in order to reduce their tax 
liability. The arm´s length principle requires associated enterprises to charge the 
same prices, royalties and other fees in relation to a transaction among them (a 
so-called “controlled transaction”) that would be charged by independent parties 
in an uncontrolled transaction in otherwise comparable circumstances.45 This 
principle is meant to prevent that conditions could be made or imposed between 
the two enterprises to reduce their tax liability in countries with higher tax rates 
by allocating their profits to countries with low tax rates. 
 The OECD Council of 9 April 1998 adopted this recommendation 6, which 
accounts for its soft law character.46 This recommendation was adopted by all 
Member States of the OECD, which means that they have to follow it, unless 
states have put forward “reservations” with regard to their position to the 
recommended measures.47 Nonetheless, the fact that the recommendations were 
adopted by agreement of all Member States of the OECD adds to their weight. 
The normative force of this recommendation was further strengthened by the 
reference to it in the EU Code of Conduct on Business Taxation (para B4) as a 
standard to be taken into account.48  
 In the next section I will elaborate on the EU Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation, a specific soft law instrument. Then, I will proceed with the question of 
why soft law is used as an alternative to European legislation in order to explain 
the introduction of the Code. Than I will turn to the question of what conception 
of governing and law-making accounts for the use of soft law. To answer this 
question, some reflections on the notion of governance and soft law, as an 
alternative to European legislation, are necessary. 
                              
45 According to this principle, profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to 
one of the enterprises in a state but, by reason of those conditions, have not accrued may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. See article 9, para 1 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention and the elaborated OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises an Tax Administrations at www.oecd.org (last accessed 18 December 
2007). 
46 The Council is made up by representatives of member countries and of the European 
Commission. 
47 States may also have material reasons for not following the guidelines, such as singularities in 
the domestic law. 
48 J Calderón, “The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as a Source of Tax Law: Is Globalization 
Reaching the Tax Law?” (2007) 35 Intertax 8.  
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D. THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR BUSINESS TAXATION 
As shown above, in the 1990s, harmful tax competition became a hotly debated 
topic in the European Union. However, harmful tax competition is a truly 
international problem. Therefore, some of the OECD’s efforts to tackle harmful 
tax competition were pointed out and it was shown that the OECD efforts 
reinforced the EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation. This Code was a 
major step forward in the fight against harmful tax competition. This soft law 
instrument was deemed to be expedient because most Member States felt that a 
(hard law) directive would erode political sovereignty. 
 Thus, the unanimity requirement poses a major obstacle to harmonisation in 
the field of direct taxes. The introduction of the Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation was a reaction to the toilsome process of achieving (limited) integration. 
The Monti Memorandum was instrumental in creating a sense of urgency to 
increase the coordination of the tax policies of the Member States (supra, section 
C.1). In a subsequent report, the Commission underlined the need for a group of 
high representatives of Member States which should achieve consensus on the tax 
measures to be considered harmful in the Community context and on the common 
criteria for the identification with an eye to the establishment of a “code of good 
conduct.”49
 These developments resulted in the adoption of a comprehensive package to 
tackle harmful tax competition by the ECOFIN Council on 1 December 1997.50 
This package was composed of three linked elements: the Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation, measures to eliminate distortions in effective taxation of 
savings income, and measures to eliminate withholding taxes on cross-border 
payments of interest and royalties between associated enterprises. Thus, the 
Conduct of Conduct for Business Taxation was agreed on by the ECOFIN 
Council, ie, the Finance Ministers of the (then 15) EU Member States.51  
 The Conduct of Conduct for Business Taxation is an instrument to tackle 
harmful tax competition. To be sure, the preamble acknowledges the positive 
effects of fair tax competition and the need to consolidate the competitiveness of 
the European Union at international level, but it also notes that this competition 
may lead to tax measures with harmful effects. The adoption of the Code by the 
Council as a resolution accounts for its non-legal nature. The Code of Conduct is 
                              
49 Taxation in the European Union: Report on the Development of Tax Systems, COM(1996) 
546 final, 22.10.1996. For an historic overview, see Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law, supra, 
n 19, 196-199. 
50 This package was based on a proposal put forward by the Commission: see paper Towards 
Tax Co-ordination in the European Union – A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition, 
COM(97) 495, 1.10.1997, and A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition in the European 
Union, COM(97) 564 final, 5.11.1997. 
51 OJ No. C 2, 6.1.1998, 1. 
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not legally binding, which is emphasised by its preamble: “the Code of Conduct 
is a political commitment and does not affect the Member States’ rights and 
obligations or the respective spheres of competence of the Member States and the 
Community resulting from the Treaty.” 
 The Code embodies a legislative drafting strategy that makes a substantive 
advance towards tax coordination.52 The Code of Conduct concerns those 
business tax measures that “affect, or may affect in a significant way the location 
of business activity in the Community.”53 The tax measures covered by the Code 
include any measure on business – law, regulations as well as administrative 
practices – whether through the nominal tax rate, the tax base, or any other 
relevant factor. Not all tax measures are harmful, of course. So, the Code first 
defines potentially harmful tax measures. The defining characteristic is “a 
significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, than those 
which generally apply in the Member State in question.”54 In identifying 
measures which are in fact harmful, several other factors are considered. The not 
exhaustive account of these supplemental factors includes: whether tax measures 
apply only to non-residents, whether tax benefits available without there being 
any real economic activity, whether the Member State follows the OECD transfer 
pricing guidelines (see supra, section C.2), and whether the measure lacks 
transparency (including covert relaxation of rules at the administrative level). 
 With this “gentlemen’s agreement”, the Member States (politically) 
committed themselves in the first place to refrain from introducing new 
potentially harmful tax measures (“standstill”). Furthermore they agreed to re-
examine existing laws and practices to identify existing potentially harmful tax 
measures for elimination, and to roll back the existing tax measures which were 
labelled harmful within two years (as a general rule). The potential harmful tax 
measures would be assessed in a review process. Peer review took place by a tax 
policy group of high representatives of the Member States, the so-called 
Primarolo group, named after Dawn Primarolo, the UK Paymaster General who 
chaired the committee.  
 Any Member State could report possibly harmful tax measures provided by 
another Member State until 31 January 1999. This “informer” provision proved a 
great success. Member States put more than 175 measures on the list.55 After 
                              
52 W W Bratton and J A McCahery, “Tax Coordination and Tax Competition in the European 
Union: Evaluating the Code of Conduct on Business Taxation” 38 (2001) Common Market Law 
Review 685. 
53 Conduct of Conduct for Business Taxation, Annex to the ECOFIN Council meeting on 1 
December 1997, OJ No. C 2, 6.1.1998, 3. 
54  Ibid, 3 
55 B J Kiekebeld, Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union: Code of Conduct, 
Countermeasures and EU Law (Deventer, Kluwer, 2004), 48.  
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having presented two interim reports, the Primarolo group submitted its final 
report to the ECOFIN Council on 29 November 1999.56 This final Report singled 
identified 66 (existing) rules and practices as potentially harmful tax practices. 
The reactions of the Member States may be found in its footnotes. They concern 
not only views and reservations on their measures which were put on the 
“blacklist”, but also more general comments on the work of the Primarolo group 
and on the Report as a whole.  
 The Primarolo Report has not yet been formally approved by the Council, due 
to disagreement of several Member States on the blacklisting of their own 
measures. Another point of Member States’ criticism was the fact that the Report, 
as regards the criteria applied, in some instances seems to go beyond the scope of 
the Code of Conduct and the Group’s mandate. However, in an interim agreement 
on the package reached on 27 November 2000, the Member States decided not to 
formally reject the report (and its blacklist). The agreement provided for a 
conditional phasing-out of the designated measures.57 This “interim agreement” 
entered into force on 3 June 2003, when an agreement was reached on the entire 
package to tackle harmful tax competition and on two directive proposals, on 
savings income and on cross-border interest and royalty payments between 
associated enterprises, respectively (Interest and Royalty Directive58 and the 
Interest Savings Directive59). Thus, Member States finally agreed on the 
(continued) Primarolo exercise.  
 The Code is a soft law instrument that does not legally bind the Member 
States. Nevertheless, its adoption marks an important step towards (further) tax 
coordination. “By proceeding softly where hard approaches have failed, the Code 
will [has] garnered agreement in principle to coordination, broadly phrased.”60 
The non-binding nature of the Code may be considered a strength rather than a 
weakness. On account of the peer pressure involved, Member States have taken 
                              
56 Code of Conduct Group, European Council, Report on the Code of Conduct (Business 
Taxation), SN 4901/99, 29.11.1999.  In addition, at the request of the Code of Conduct Group, 
the Commission provided two studies to assist the Group in the review process; Kiekebeld, 
Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union, supra, n 55, 49. 
57 As part of the agreement, the Council adopted three sets of guidelines containing general 
criteria based on those set out in the Primarolo Report. See Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law, 
supra, n 19, 209 ff. 
58 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to 
interest and royalty payments made between associated companies in different Member States, 
OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, 49, adapted by Council Directive 2004/66/EC, OJ L 168, 1.5.2004, 35.   
59 Council Directive 2003/48/EC, 3.6.2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest 
payments, OJ L 157 of 26.6.2003, 38-48.  
60 Bratton and McCahery, “Tax Coordination and Tax Competition in The European Union”, 
supra, n 52, 685. 
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the Code seriously and amended most of their tax measures to comply with it.61 
The Code of Conduct is generally regarded to be a quite effective political 
instrument.62 The Primarolo Report, stemming from the Code of Conduct, is a 
fundamental step in the fight against harmful tax competition. Not only does it 
contain a blacklist of harmful tax measures, but it also sets out the specific criteria 
used. Thus, important negative integration was achieved through the Member 
States suspending application of the tax measures under scrutiny, eg, the Dutch 
group finance company regime.63 Ireland announced soon after the adoption of 
the Code that it was phasing out its preferential tax regimes and replacing them 
with a single lower rate of corporation tax applicable to all enterprises.64  
 There is often a subtle interplay between soft law and hard law. This also goes 
for the Code of Conduct which was reinforced by a more strict application by the 
Commission of the Treaty rules on State aid. The State aid criteria and the Code 
of Conduct have a dominant influence on the national debates on corporate 
income tax.65 Thus, the combination of hard law and soft law was used to 
convince the Member States to take their obligations with regard to tax 
coordination more seriously. Soft law itself may also have hard edges. Notable is 
the fact that the results of the Primarolo report were presented as acquis 
communautaire in the negotiations with new Member States. Here, a switch 
appears to have been made: soft law became a form of “extremely hard law.”66 Of 
course, this treatment may lead to considerable pressure from new Members 
States on the old Member States to fully comply with the Code. Finally, soft law 
instruments from different institutional contexts may reinforce each other. In this 
respect it is interesting that the Code of Conduct explicitly refers to the OECD 
transfer pricing guidelines, on the one hand, and that the Code has had a 
                              
61 Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law, supra, n 19, 205-206. Kiekebeld, Harmful Tax 
Competition in the European Union, supra, n 55, 51. 
62 Cf Menéndez, “The Purse of the Polity”, supra, n 28, 201: “The Code of Conduct (also) had a 
limited but not irrelevant impact on the definition of national corporate income tax bases.” 
63 See, eg, Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 117. 
64 R S Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crises of the Welfare State” 
(2000) 113 Harvard Law Review 1652. 
65 H Vording, “Naar 25 procent, en verder” (2005) 134 Weekblad fiscaal recht 737. The 
Commission studied all national measures already discussed within the Primarolo group; Terra 
and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 116. 
66 J M Mösner, “Der Code of Conduct for Business Taxation vom 1.12.1997”, in M Lang, 
J Schuch and C. Staringer (eds), Soft Law in der Praxis (Vienna, Linde Verlag, 2005), 144. For 
Cyprus, which as part of its preparation for accession had to streamline its tax regime, see C HJI 
Panayi, “The Effect of Community Law on Pre-Accession Tax Treaties” (2007) 16 EC Tax 
Review 131: “Cyprus had to align its legislation with EU provisions on state aid and the EU 
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation.” 
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significant impact on the work of the OECD in the field of harmful tax 
competition, on the other.67
 Having set out the characteristics of the Code of Conduct and the process of 
assessment of potentially harmful tax measures it brought about, I will continue 
with some reflections on the notions of new governance and soft law, in order to 
put the Code of Conduct in a broader regulatory perspective. The emphasis is on 
horizontal interaction and involvement of civil society. Alternative means of 
regulation, soft law instruments among them, fit in well with this less hierarchical 
approach. The communicative quality of soft law is a key to its legitimacy. 
Communication by way of public consultation and participation may enhance the 
legitimacy and responsiveness of these soft instruments, as will be shown.  
E. NEW GOVERNANCE AND SOFT LAW 
1. New governance 
The term new governance is a multi-faceted concept which is fluid and variable 
in content. In part 1 of this diptych on soft law I analysed the “essentially 
contested concept” of (new) governance in a national context, with regard to 
public administration and organisations in the private sector, especially 
multinational corporations (corporate governance).68 Now I will focus on the 
term governance in the context of international and transnational organizations. 
 The term governance has several sets of meanings. In the literature, 
governance in the context of international and transnational organizations is often 
characterised as ‘horizontal networks and authority relationships defined by 
flexibility and voluntary rules.”69 The emphasis is clearly on informal 
arrangements such as innovative practices of networks and new (horizontal) 
forms of interaction.70 There is a shift of attention from the formal legal order 
strongly related to the sovereign state to informal relationships in which 
responsible citizens and organisations are engaged. This need not imply doing 
away with government; it conceptualizes the relationship between state(s) and 
                              
67 Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crises of the Welfare State”, 
supra n 64, 1654. 
68 Gribnau, “Soft Law and Taxation”, supra n 2, 293-96 and 299-301, respectively. 
69 U Mörth, “Introduction”, in U Mörth (ed), Soft Law in Governance and Regulation: An 
Interdisciplinary Analysis (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004), 1. 
70 Cf E O Eriksen, “Reflexive Integration in the EU”, in Eriksen, Making the European Polity, 
supra, n 28, 11. 
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stakeholders in a less vertical way.71 I understand the well-known phrase 
“governing without Government” rather to mean that government is no longer 
supreme, because all the actors in particular policy areas need each other.72  
 The traditional command and control approach based on hierarchical top 
down legislation and enforcement is becoming obsolete as the state needs 
citizens, interest groups, networks, and experts to furnish information. (This does 
not alter the fact that in many countries traditional modes of governance are still 
en vogue.) States and their agencies are partly dependent upon data, information, 
and documents provided by civil society. Furthermore, (new) governance is about 
meeting the needs of the people, which cannot but involve the people themselves 
in one way or another. Solving public problems which have become too complex 
for a government to handle on its own, and pursuing public purposes about which 
disagreements exists cannot but be a matter of collaboration between public 
agencies and the people. Consequently, at the heart of the governance approach is 
a shift away from hierarchy to networks with continuing interaction between 
interdependent actors in order to exchange resources and negotiate shared 
purposes, problems, and solutions.73
 However, informal processes will often become more formalised. Procedural 
rules are needed to regulate issues such as the choice of topics (agenda setting), 
and how opposing views should be treated. These legal procedures are aimed at 
providing fair structures of discussion between parties with “opposing interests 
and divergent understandings of what a regulatory problem is, and agents whose 
actions are not always rational.”74 Consequently, new governance structures 
promote proceduralisation, engagement, and dialogue in order to enable 
                              
71 There are also many non-state (global) governance schemes which “by definition lack the 
traditional enforcement capacities associated with the sovereign state―the traditional site of 
authority in the international system where power, legitimacy, and political community appeared 
fused”; S Bernstein and B Cashore, “Non-State Global Governance: Is Forest Certification a 
Legitimate Alternative to a Global Forest Convention?”, in Kirton and Trebilcock (eds), Hard 
Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance 
(Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004), 33. 
72 Cf R A W Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity 
and Accountability (Buckingham, Open University Press, 2002), 450-51.  
73 Of course, this does not mean complete (legal) equality of the parties involved or the absence 
of any hierarchy or exclusive (legal) competence. However, interdependency often exists also 
within asymmetrical power relations characterized by opposing interests (see Gribnau, “Soft 
Law and Taxation”, supra, n 2, 293-96). 
74 K Sideri, Law’s Practical Wisdom: The Theory and Practice of Law Making in New 
Governance Structures in the European Union (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007), 119; S Smismans, 
“Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance: From Concepts to Research Agenda”, in S 
Smismans (ed), Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishers, 2006), 9, also points out that, while the involvement of civil society in governance is 
often informal, it “may also be institutionalised and codified―for instance, through consultation 
procedures―and publicly enforced.”  
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agreement, compromise, and consensus.75 However, there also risks involved, 
such as the risk of fragmentation of policy and political decision-making, which 
may be at odds with the need for continuity. This fragmentation also makes it 
more difficult to see who exactly can be held accountable for deciding what. This 
kind of shared responsibility leads to “the problem of many hands”: if no one can 
be held accountable, then no one needs to behave responsibly.76
 The success of the term “governance” may thus come from the fact that it 
“allows all the potential players to contribute to the debates in the domain of 
institutions and rules. In this vein, Slaughter seeks to develop a new model for 
international law that goes beyond the traditional focus on states as the basic 
actors and creators of law. There is a change in the relevant actors doing the 
social construction of international legal rules. New actors form networks capable 
of producing “transnational consensus” on specific rules and approaches. The 
goal is a new consensus that produces new and better norms. This consensus 
moves “soft law” into firm principles of international law that focus on various 
levels of rule-initiation, rule-making and rule-enforcement processes.77 The 
notion of governance makes visible and may help to understand the very 
important transformations in the state and state institutions that are now taking 
place. In line with these transformations the law and the way it changes should be 
examined. More specifically, a new focus on the production and legitimation of 
law itself is needed, ie, “the social construction of rules at the national and 
transnational level, taking into account competitive processes and hierarchies of 
authority.”78  
 In general, the governance approach shifts the focus to the processes and 
actors that are part of policy-making or offer alternative sources of governing, 
stressing the importance of different stages of policy-making and modes of 
governing. These processes and actors are ignored by the “traditional focus on the 
core institutions of ‘government’, namely parliament, executive, administration 
                              
75 Sideri, Law's Practical Wisdom, supra, n 74, 5. She argues that compromise “provides the 
theoretical tools to move away from the notions of consensus―reaching agreement on universal 
principles―and strategic bargaining in order to maximise egoistic interests.” 
76 M Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex 
Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 45 ff. 
77 A M Slaughter, “Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International Systems”, in 
Y Dezalay and B Garth (eds), Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and 
Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 
12-36. 
78 Y Dezalay and B Garth, “Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy”, in id, Global 
Prescriptions, supra, n 77, 312. They point to the fact that, in this way different disciplines may 
study the social construction of institutions and rules, because “governance” can, for example, 
“include formal procedures and rules as well as the more informal spaces typically studied by 
anthropologists” (311). All disciplines may meet and fight. 
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and party politics.”79 In a way, traditional formal and hierarchical governance is 
complemented by modes of informal governance. In my view, the shift away 
from state centrist thinking and acting is a basic rethinking of the state and its 
functions, rather than completely abandoning the concept of the state. Even so, 
soft and hard law are often intertwined, as will be shown. According to this 
“governance” concept, legitimate regulation presupposes the involvement of civil 
society; this concept recognizes the importance of the multiple interactions 
between public structures and civil society. The Commission White Paper on 
European Governance uses a (normative) definition of its own: “rules, processes 
and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European 
level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness 
and coherence.” This rather limited number of principles underpin “good 
governance.”80 A few years later, in 2004, the Commission became more specific 
as to the content of the concept “governance”: “The way public functions are 
carried out, public resources are managed and public regulatory powers are 
exercised is the major issue to be addressed in that context.”81 Note that the 
reference to certain principles marks the difference between “governance” and 
“good governance.” According to the OECD, good governance principles 
transform not only the relationship between governments, citizens, and 
parliaments, but the effective functioning of government itself.82
 Van Gerven links good governance explicitly to a government’s capacity to 
achieve citizens’ goals. The idea of good governance, therefore, refers to “the 
exercise of public power to pursue objectives and attain results in the interest of 
the people through a variety of regulative and executive processes.”83 Here, the 
                              
79 S Smismans, Law, Legitimacy, and European Governance (Oxford University Press, 2004), 
25-26. Cf id, “Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance: From Concepts to Research 
Agenda”, in id, Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance, supra, n 74, 3-19.  
80 White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428 final, 8. D Curtin and I Dekker, 
“Good Governance: The Concept and its Application by the European Union”, in D M Curtin 
and R A Wessel (eds), Good Governance and the European Union: Reflections on Concepts, 
Institutions and Substance (Antwerp, Intersentia Uitgevers, 2005), 4. They take a critical stance 
to this peculiar definition whereby the Commission effectively incorporates its own agenda into 
the definition without any reference to the other definitions “in existing literature nor with the 
practice of other international organisations.” They discuss two of the five principles, viz, the 
EU principle of openness and of participation. 
81 Communication on Governance and Development Policy, COM(2003) 615 final, 3. 
82 “These principles are: respect for the rule of law; openness, transparency and accountability 
to democratic institutions; fairness and equity in dealings with citizens, including mechanisms 
for consultation and participation; efficient, effective services; clear, transparent and applicable 
laws and regulations; consistency and coherence in policy formation; and high standards of 
ethical behaviour”; http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_2649_37405_1923009_1_1_1_374 
05,00.html (last accessed 18 December 2007). 
83 W van Gerven, The European Union. A Polity of States and Peoples (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2005), 158. 
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descriptive and the normative notions of “governance” are relevant, as Westerman 
points out. Therefore, “governance” and “good governance” are not clearly 
separated. “Actual regulatory practices, ‘best practices’ as well as the principles 
that should be met in order to count as such a ‘best practice’, all seem to be 
captured by the same notion of governance.”84
 According to the Commission good governance requires the Union to renew 
the Community method of governance by following “a less top-down approach 
and complementing its policy tools more effectively with non-legislative 
instruments.” To achieve improvement, it must be recognized that “legislation is 
often only part of a broader solution combining formal rules with other non-
binding tools such as recommendations, guidelines, or even self-regulation within 
a commonly agreed framework.”85 Such s oft law instruments as Codes of 
Conduct fit in well with this idea of more diversified governance schemes in the 
European Community. 
2. The new European legislative culture86 
(a) A shift in European legislative policy 
Governance emerged in the European Union as a result of a shift in the European 
legislative policy. This new policy had two aims; firstly, less and better legislation 
and, secondly, more diversified European governance mechanisms. The latter aim 
comprises the use of soft law. What are the reasons for this new European 
legislative policy? During the second half of the 1980s, a new way of thinking on 
European legislation developed. The stagnation of the internal market and the 
citizens’ doubts about the necessity and advantages of the common market 
contributed to Euro-scepticism, a growing anti-integrationist mood and demands 
for subsidiarity. The existing national deregulatory tendencies, and the criticism 
of both the quantity and the quality of the body of European legislation and the 
burden it imposed on national authorities and companies “constituted an effective 
catalyst for the EC to reconsider its legislative task.”87 The aims of better 
regulation and ensuring good governance invoked a debate on the extent to which 
                              
84 P Westerman, “Governing by Goals: Governance as a Legal Style” (2007) 1 Legisprudence, 
52. She further points out that the term “governance” is often used as a manifesto and an agenda 
for reform, the White Paper on European Governance being a case in point. 
85 COM(2001) 428 final, 4 and 20.  
86 For a previous version of this section, see H Gribnau, “Improving the Legitimacy of Soft Law 
in EU Tax Law” (2007) 35 Intertax 31-33. 
87 L Senden, “Soft Law, Self-regulation and Co-Regulation in European Law: Where Do They 
Meet?”(2005) 9 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, <http://www.ejcl.org/> (last accessed 
13 December 2007); cf L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law: Its Relationship to 
Legislation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004). 
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the traditional Community command and control method (whereby the Council 
and the European Parliament decide upon a proposal from the Commission) was 
still the right way to proceed, and what new modes of European governance 
should be explored and promoted. An interest was developed in modalities of 
“new governance” to overcome the prevalent style of governance which “was 
paternalistic rather than participatory, providing for example, for the uses of 
EcoSoc and the social partners as machinery for consultation in rule-making 
procedures.” 88
 This debate on alternative modes of governance brought about, in the wording 
of the European Commission, a “new legislative culture.”89 As a result, the aims 
of European legislative policy were changed. The general idea was that 
legislation should be pitched on a more general or abstract level, stating a 
framework for implementation, rather than becoming deeply involved in the 
detail.90 On the one hand, there was the aim to make less use of the instrument of 
legislation and to reduce the existing body of European legislation. Improving the 
quality of European legislation is also an important point here. On the other hand, 
the White Paper proposed to make more use of other modes of governance or 
regulation, which are of a less compelling or of a non-governmental nature. Thus, 
the use of soft law was encouraged as a means of differentiating the legislative 
instruments of the European Community. 
(b)  Less and better European legislation 
The subject of this article being soft law, I will only make a few remarks on the 
first aim of the new Union's legislative policy, ie, less and better legislation. Here, 
simplification and deregulation are the key words for putting the motto “do less in 
order to do better” into practice.91
                              
88 C Harlow, “Civil Society Organisations and Participatory Administration: A Challenge to EU 
Administrative Law?”, in Smismans, Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance, supra, 
n 74, 124. She argues that, far from representing civil society, all kinds of comitology 
procedures represent the interests of the Member States, committee members being chiefly 
public servants (unelected and nominated by their employers). Comitology―a structure of 
advisory committees and expert groups―includes consultation with interest representatives, 
national government employees, and experts for both drafting its regulations and monitoring 
compliance with them. There seems to be a shift from a closed-circuit rulemaking system to 
more inclusive participatory and transparent procedures. 
89 See the Report on Implementation of the Commission’s work programme for 1996, European 
Commission, Brussels, 16.10.1996, 10. 
90 COM(2001) 428 final, 20.  
91 See the Commission opinion “Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement”, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1996, 13. See also the Council 
Resolution of 8 July 1996 on legislative and administrative simplification in the field of the 
internal market, OJ 1996, C 224/5. 
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 According to the Molitor Report, simplification implies “that it is essential to 
ensure that regulation imposes the least constraint on competitiveness and 
employment whilst maximizing the benefits of direct government intervention.” 
92 Deregulation is linked to simplification because “in some instances, an 
unavoidable extension of simplification will be the reduction or removal of 
government regulations, where such regulations are no longer necessary, or where 
their objectives can be achieved more effectively through alternative 
mechanisms.”93
 Consequently, deregulation explicitly aims at limiting legislative activity to 
what is necessary, reducing the complexity of the European body of legislation, 
and enhancing its accessibility. This may entail not only the consolidation and 
codification of legislation but also the removal of obsolete legislation. A fine 
example of codification is the realisation of the Community Customs Code.94 
Codification means the adoption of a formal legal act95 through which all earlier 
texts are repealed and replaced by one new text. Codification, in principle at least, 
does not alter the original contents.96
(c) Alternative means of regulation 
Diminishing the amount of European regulation is not always possible. Often 
regulations are deemed to be inevitable. However, legislation may be avoided 
when other forms of governance or regulation are available. Several non-
legislative instruments or modes of governance are a possible alternative at the 
European level. In its Action plan “Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory 
Environment”, the Commission distinguished a broad range of modes of 
governance, particularly the use of soft law (recommendations), co-regulation, 
voluntary sectoral agreements, benchmarking, peer pressure, networks, and the 
open method of co-ordination.97
 In passing it may be noted that the OECD soft law governance approach 
seems to have been a source of inspiration for the EU. The OECD is a framework 
for convening networks of national ministers of thirty countries who share 
                              
92 Molitor Report COM(95) 288, 21.6.1995. 
93 Molitor Report COM(95) 288. See also the Communication Implementing the Community 
Lisbon Programme: A Strategy for the Simplification of the Regulatory Environment, 
COM(2005) 535 final, in which the Commission (following a broad consultation of Member 
States and stakeholders) proposes to repeal, codify, recast or modify 222 basic legislations and 
over 1,400 related legal acts in the next three years.  
94 Established in Council Regulation 2913/92, OJ 1992, L 302/1. 
95 Codification occurs when a formal legal act is adopted, such as a regulation or a directive, on 
the basis of the prescribed procedures. 
96 See, in this sense the Conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council, Bull. EC 12-1992, 15.  
97 Communication from the Commission, COM(2002) 278 final, 5.6.2002, 7.  
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information, conduct studies and produce model codes.98 It is the archetypical 
example of an intergovernmental organisation that “governs through deliberation, 
persuasion, surveillance and self regulation.”99 An important part of the OECD 
governance is “legal governance”, the adoption of binding as well as non-binding 
legal texts through formal decision-making procedures.100 To an increasing 
extent, non-binding recommendations and guidelines are becoming typical 
instruments applied in formal decision-making forums. Of the acts in force, only 
about 20% can be classified as binding. All others can be categorized as non-
binding. In the context of fiscal affairs, fifteen Recommendations and one 
Convention belonged to this type of soft law in 2004, according to Marcussen.101 
The OECD has developed and refined various soft law governance mechanisms. 
Recommendations adopted by the OECD Council, such as to follow the OECD 
transfer pricing Guidelines of 1995, though not legally binding on the Member 
Countries, have great authority and are often complied with.102 According to 
Engelen, the OECD Model Tax Convention and its Commentaries also have 
authority in Non-Member Countries, due to the possibility of inviting the 
governments of these countries to participate in the activities of the OECD and 
because the ongoing process of revising this Convention and its Commentaries 
has “been opened up to benefit from the input of non-member States, other 
international organisations and other interested parties.”103 Thus, consultation is 
instrumental to the goal of achieving transnational consensus. Other international 
organisations, such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the European Union, have increasingly adopted the OECD soft law model. 
                              
98 See “OECD: About”, on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
<www.oecd.org> (last accessed 17 December 2007). 
99 M Marcussen, “OECD Governance through Soft Law”, in Mörth (ed), Soft Law in 
Governance and Regulation, supra, n 69, 103. 
100 Ibid, 104. He also distinguishes two other categories of OECD governance; normative 
governance, “the development and diffusion of informal rules of appropriateness in a multitude 
of committees” (good governance measures, for instance), and cognitive governance, “the 
construction of a sense of community, solidarity and common myths among the OECD Member 
States.” 
101 Ibid, 109. A nice example is the Final Seoul Declaration, 15 September 2006, expanding “the 
OECD 2004 Governance Guidelines to give greater attention to the linkage between tax and 
good governance”; see Gribnau, “Soft Law and Taxation”, supra, n 2, 313, fn 68.   
102 For a number of factors contributing to the great authority of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and its Commentaries, see F Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under 
International Law (IBFD, Amsterdam 2004), 455-458. 
103 Ibid, 457. In order to become more inclusive, the OECD tries to develop networks of 
ministers from less-developed countries to offer reactions and advice on the various codes it is 
developing; A-M Slaughter, A New World Order? (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004), 
143. 
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 In the following, I will focus on some aspects of the Conduct of Conduct for 
Business Taxation, which is but one of the EU soft law instruments, which are in 
their turn part of the non-legislative instruments or modes of governance. 
However, it should be borne in mind that this use of soft law instead of legislation 
is not an end in itself; already in the above-mentioned White Paper on European 
Governance, it is seen as a means to contribute to enhance values such as 
effectiveness, legitimacy, and transparency. Clearly, the use of soft law in direct 
taxation, notably the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, is often not just a 
matter of less (and better) European tax legislation. In 1994, Snyder argued that 
the European Commission resorted to soft law, in part as a response to 
institutional inertia, and in part as an “attempt to circumvent or avoid the 
implications to reach political agreement.”104 Similarly, the use of soft law in 
direct taxation seems to be rather a pragmatic second best choice, traditional 
command and control legislation being hard to achieve in view of the difficulty of 
reaching unanimous agreement. This lack of political consensus blocks the road 
to traditional legislation. The choice of the voluntary Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation, for example, was the result of political expediency. “Most 
governments felt that a directive would erode political sovereignty and would be 
difficult to manage.”105
 Furthermore, the European Commission often resorts to soft law in direct 
taxation, but it is not the only European institution which can implement soft law. 
The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, for instance, was agreed on by the 
Finance Ministers of the Member States. The soft law approach in policy and rule 
making, therefore, is a matter of institutional interplay, a cooperative effort by 
several European institutions. 
 In spite of the apparent effect of soft law in the European context, a clearly 
defined concept of soft law is lacking. Therefore, the concept of soft law needs to 
be clarified, in particular the different ways in which it presents itself and the 
different functions it can be said to fulfil. I will address these important topics in 
the next section. 
                              
104 F Snyder, “Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community”, in S Martin 
(ed), The Construction of Europe: Essays in Honour of Emile Noël (Dordrecht, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1994), 199-200. Cf Cini, “The Soft Law Approach”, supra, n 23, 199: 
after the Commission failed to persuade the Council to regulate the politicized State aid area, it 
began to rely more and more on its own informal rule-making (guidelines). 
105 Radaelli, “The Code of Conduct against Harmful Tax Competition, supra, n 30, 521. 
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F. SOFT LAW 
1. Soft law: a global phenomenon 
The term “soft law” is used in many EU contexts and for a wide array of 
instruments. Communications, codes of conduct, and recommendations were 
already mentioned. The notion of “soft law” should therefore be clarified. The 
concept of soft law is a subject of great debate among legal scholars. In the field 
of international law, soft law is often seen as a device that can be deliberately 
used by non-state actors, to influence state behaviour when there is little prospect 
of successfully concluding a treaty. Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and 
individual experts may produce declaratory and programmatic texts at 
international conferences. Despite high governmental participation in these 
conferences and preparatory meetings, these final conference documents are 
mostly not binding. However, once “a prospective norm has been formulated in 
soft form it can become a catalyst for the development of customary international 
law.” 106 Consequently, soft law refers to principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures that “rely primarily on the participation and resources of 
nongovernmental actors in the construction, operation, and implementation of a 
governance arrangement.”107
 Snyder’s definition of soft law may serve as a starting point: “[r]ules of 
conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless 
may have practical effects.”108 Kirton and Trebilcock identify four characteristics 
which distinguish soft law from hard law. Soft law does not rely upon the formal 
legal, regulatory authority and power of the state, and there is voluntary 
participation, and a strong reliance on consensus-based decision-making for 
action―and as a source for legitimacy. Finally, the authoritative sanctioning 
power of the state to induce consent and compliance is absent.109 
Notwithstanding these four distinguishing characteristics, the hard law-soft law 
                              
106 C Chinkin, “Normative Development in the International Legal System”, in D Shelton (ed), 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal 
System (Oxford University Press, 2003), 21-42. She points out that to many commentators, this 
hardening of soft law is “the raison d’être of soft law and its entry point into the traditional 
sources of law.”  
107 J J Kirton and M J Trebilcock, “Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable”, in 
Kirton and Trebilcock, Hard Choices, Soft Law, supra, n 71, 3-29, 9. For an analysis of 
substantive and procedural criteria to assess the legitimacy of NGOs, see A Vedder (ed), NGO 
Involvement in International Governance and Policy: Sources and Legitimacy (Leiden/Boston, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).    
108 Snyder, “Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community”, supra, n 104,198; 
he does not stress the aim of it having legal/practical effects. 
109 Kirton and Trebilcock, “Introduction”, supra, n 107, 9.   
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duality may be conceived as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. This is partly 
due to the fact that the category of international law itself is nuanced, which 
accounts for the variable weight of norms.110 Soft law instruments themselves 
may have a variable weight, because hardening of soft law is possible.111 The 
inclusion of soft law in hard law suggests, according to Shelton, that both form 
and content are relevant to the sense of legal obligation. Some forms of soft law 
may even have a “specific content that is ‘harder’ than the soft commitments 
treaties.” 112 Furthermore, international soft law comes in many forms used by 
different institutions. Informal institutions may use voluntary standards, but soft 
law also includes formal intergovernmental organisations using voluntary codes. 
 The precise significance and effect of EU legal instruments, such as soft law, 
can of course only be assessed against the specific background and peculiarities 
of the European Community legal order. Assessing and improving the legitimacy 
of European soft law, therefore, is not a matter of merely transplanting 
international practices, for example, with regard to public participation and 
consultation of such non-state actors as NGOs, individual experts and enterprises 
in formulating soft law documents. Although many similarities may exist between 
international soft law and EU soft law instruments, these instruments must be 
assessed in the light of the proper legal system, as the Community constitutes a 
legal order in its own right. Unlike many international settings, there is a 
legislator in the Community, and therefore, hard law. The Council and the 
European Parliament, deciding upon a proposal from the Commission, produce 
legislation. Furthermore, in contrast with the European Union, international 
institutions and regimes are to a great extent hardly capable of becoming 
politically autonomous, established as they are by nation-states existing 
independently of the institutions and regimes themselves.113 Therefore, EU soft 
law differs from international soft law, in that it is often formulated in relation to 
existing hard law. This fact accounts for some characteristics of EU soft law and 
the use made of it.  
 Nonetheless, the notion of “soft law” as used in the EU bears many 
similarities to conceptions of soft law in an international (as well as national) 
context. In the context of the EC, legal doctrine points to three core elements of 
soft law. Firstly, the concept refers to “rules of conduct” or “commitments”. The 
second element is that these rules or commitments are laid down in instruments 
                              
110 Chinkin, “Normative Development in the International Legal System”, supra, n 106, 24. 
Compliance and non-compliance with law cannot be separated from extra-legal factors. 
111 For the hardening of soft law in the context of international law, see Chinkin, “Normative 
Development in the International Legal System”, supra, n 106, 31-34. 
112 D Shelton, “Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ‘Soft Law’”, in id, 
Commitment and Compliance, supra, n 106, 4. 
113 M Zürn, “Democratic Governance beyond the Nation-State”, in M Th Greven and L W 
Pauly, Democracy beyond the State? (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 95.  
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which have no legally binding force (they are not directly enforceable) as such. 
Although soft law lacks the possibility for legal sanctions, it may nevertheless 
produce indirect legal effects. Thirdly, rules of soft law aim at, and may lead to, 
some practical effect or impact on behaviour. In this way, hard and soft law seem 
to be conceptually well distinguished. However, in practice, it is not all that clear. 
Some even argue it is not “the legal form, but substantive provisions that are 
relevant” in a given relevant policy field. 114 Consequently, there may be little 
difference between, eg, guidelines that take the form of legislation and those of a 
softer kind. This shows that the normative force of norms is not by definition of 
an all or nothing fashion, for “also within the category of so-called ‘binding’ 
decisions―like Regulations of Framework Decisions of the EU Council―one 
may discover norm-types with a variable normative force.”115
 On the basis of these elements, Senden proposes the following definition of 
soft law: “Rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been 
attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have 
certain―indirect―legal effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical 
effects.”116 Note that this definition explicitly acknowledges the tension between 
the intention (aim) and the result. Furthermore, it is clear that soft law blurs the 
distinction between law and politics. As for its non-binding character, in a way 
soft law compensates for the lack of enforceability; its softness makes “this law 
more flexible and adaptive to changing circumstances.”117 Finally, soft law 
facilitates innovation and experiment. It can provide the essential preparatory 
phase before people are ready for hard law commitments.118 However, in its form 
                              
 
114 Cini, “The Soft Law Approach”, supra, n 23, 200, referring to Rawlinson, a former Principal 
Administrator in the Commission State aid directorate. This argument will not appeal to most 
lawyers, because the uncertain legal effects have long puzzled them, as Cini tells us. Most 
lawyers and legal scholars do not have a taste for soft law and other forms of new informal 
governance. Unfortunately so, because, while “traditionally public lawyers tend to think of law 
mainly in terms of straightforward power―of issuing commands and imposing sovereign 
will―much of government power is less about the state and law and more related to engaging 
with many networks and alliances that make up the chains or networks in society which 
translate power from one locale to another” according to J Morison, “Modernising Government 
and the E-Government Revolution”, in K-N Bamforth and P Leyland (eds), Law in a Multi-
layered Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003), 157-188, 167. See also Westerman, 
“Governing by Goals”, supra, n 84, 53.  
115 I F Dekker and A Wessel, “Governance by International Organizations: Rethinking the 
Normative Force of International Decisions”, in I F Dekker and W Werner (eds), Governance 
and International Legal Theory (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 227. 
116 Senden, “Soft Law, Self-regulation and Co-Regulation in European Law”, supra, n 87, 17. 
117 G Teubner (ed), “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society”, in G Teubner, 
Global Law Without a State (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997), 21.   
118 Kirton and Trebilcock, “Introduction”, supra, n 107, 12: “[M]uch of the value of soft law 
might come from its role as a pioneer or a stimulus of hard law.” The trend towards soft law is 
also valued because soft law instrument are being to some national systems and expressing more 
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as voluntary standards, soft law can also be used as an “excuse for avoiding firm 
commitments and it can come apart under pressure.” 119 Soft law, therefore, may 
well deliver standards less stringent than those required to meet current and future 
demands.120 Of course, the effectiveness of soft law instruments depends on 
different factors, eg, the (hard law) context in which it used, and the actors 
involved. To be sure, there are many forms of soft law, all with their own 
characteristics. One form may be an effective means to solve a problem, whereas 
another may be ineffective. Soft law may also have time-saving potential: 
guidelines may be quickly established, and thus speed up decision-taking and 
reduce backlogs.121 However, establishing a Code of Conduct may be very time-
consuming.  
2. The complex relationship between soft law and hard law 
EU soft law is always related to hard legislation. Soft law only exists in a broader 
setting of – primary and secondary – European legislation. Soft law is often used 
as a supplement to a hard law instrument, or as a precursor to hard law. New 
modes of governance are often backed up by the threat that “traditional legislation 
will ensue if implementation should be unsatisfactory.” 122 A case in point is the 
interplay between the Code of Conduct in the field of tax policy and State aid 
which may encompass special tax regimes in disguise. The Code of Conduct is a 
 
consensus and legitimacy. However, sometimes doubts are voiced with regard to soft law’s 
ability to contribute to a more coherent, transparent, democratic and simplified system of 
Community legal instruments (L A J Senden, “General Report. The Quality of European 
Legislation and Its Implementation and Application in the National Legal Order”, in E M H 
Hirsch Ballin and L A J Senden, Co-actorship in the Development of European Law-making. 
The Quality of European Legislation and its Implementation and Application in the National 
Legal Order (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2005), 48-49.  
119 N Bayne, “Hard and Soft Law in International Institutions: Complements, Not Alternatives”, 
in Kirton and Trebilcock, Hard Choices, Soft Law, supra, n 71, 351. 
120 In the field of global trade, environmental and social issues, businesses and civil society 
actors have long arrived at arrangements to guide their shared concerns. Soft law institutions 
have the flexibility to go beyond the narrow, codified bureaucratically entrenched rules and to 
mobilise the resources required to put new principles and norms into effect, particularly in open 
democratic societies. Kirton and Trebilcock, “Introduction”, supra, n 107, 11, point out that, 
however, “the lack of authority associated with soft law can lead to a proliferation of competing 
standards that generates duplication, confusion and uncertainty about which will prevail and 
which governments themselves might ultimately adopt.”  
121 Cini, “The Soft Law Approach”, supra, n 23, 199, referring to Rawlinson. Therefore, on a 
case-by-case basis, the significance of these instruments from a legal and a political point of 
view will have to be considered,  Senden, “General Report”, supra, n 118, 49. 
122 A Heritier, “New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy-Making without Legislation?”, in 
A Heritier (ed), Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance 
(Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 202. 
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non-binding instrument; in the domain of State aid, however, the Commission has 
considerable power. Mr Mario Monti, the former EC Commissioner for the 
internal market, who in 1997 initiated the Code of Conduct, later became EC 
Commissioner for Competition, and then switched to hard law. On 11 July 2001, 
he started formal investigation procedures under article 88(2) of the EC Treaty 
(State aid) in respect of 11 national tax measures. Thus, the Commission 
supplemented the carrot with a stick.123 Some pressure from the Commission 
based on State aid was necessary to achieve the Code of Conduct.124 Soft law, 
therefore, will not automatically make hard law superfluous.  
 In passing it should be noted that in the field of State aid itself, soft law 
instruments are used to reinforce hard law. As shown above, the State aid regime, 
which regulates the granting of subsidies by (sub)national authorities in order to 
prevent distortion of free market competition between the EU’s Member States, is 
based on EC Treaty provisions (arts 87-89; see, supra B.3). The State aid rules, 
therefore, at first sight seem to be hard law par excellence because of the powers 
accorded to the Commission. However, the State aid regime is a mixture of hard 
and soft law, for the soft law approach is also used within the Commission’ State 
aid regime. According to Cini, in substantive State aid law, there is a trend to use 
soft law to ensure compliance with hard law.125
 A recent example of this interplay between hard law and soft law is the in-
depth State aid investigation by the Commission into one part of the proposed 
Dutch groepsrentebox (group interest box) tax break scheme. The opening of this 
investigation also enables interested third parties to submit their comments on the 
proposed measures.126 According to a communication of the Dutch State 
Secretary of Finance to the Dutch parliament, the Primarolo group will decide 
upon investigating the group interest box scheme after the State aid procedure is 
                              
123 Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 114 ff. 
124 Kiekebeld, Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union, supra, n 55, 85. Interestingly, 
the EU uses the threat of the public aid prohibition of art 23 of the 1972 bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement between the EU and the Swiss Confederation to gain leverage in the negotiations on 
Swiss participation in the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation in order to tackle Swiss 
harmful tax measures, cf R H C Luja, “Should Fiscal State Aid Go Global?” (2007) 16 EC Tax 
Review 233. 
125 The situation differs substantially with regard to procedural matters, in which context the 
Regulations suggest “a trend away from soft to harder forms of regulation”, Cini, “The Soft Law 
Approach: Commission Rule-Making in the EU’s State Aid Regime”, supra, n 23, 204. 
However, this is still about nuances of softness and hardness of ways of regulating, for “the state 
aid policy area seems to be shifting towards harder, albeit not legally binding rules”, 
M Aldestam, “Soft Law in the State Aid Policy Area”, in Mörth, Soft Law in Governance and 
Regulation, supra, n 69, 33-34.  
126 IP/07/154, 07.02.2007; another part of the group interest box scheme was approved by the 
Commission. 
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finished.127 Another example is soft law as part of a policy package of (mostly 
direct-tax) measures.128 A case in point is the Commission’s 1997 package to 
tackle harmful tax competition by means of the Code of Conduct, measures to 
eliminate distortions in effective taxation of savings income, and measures to 
eliminate withholding taxes on cross-border payments of interest and royalties 
between companies; the final outcome being the Interest and Royalty Directive129 
and the Interest Savings Directive130, both adopted in 2003. This tax package 
meant an emphasis on so-called tax coordination, which “comes hand in hand 
with the abandonment of legislative proposals of a more systematic character.” 131
Not only the Commission “implements” soft law into hard law. The EC Court of 
Justice also uses components of soft law in its rulings, eg, on the Commission’s 
Recommendation on the tax treatment of non-residents of 1993.132 The ECJ not 
only adopted the ideas of the Commission in its case law, but even surpassed 
them in the cases of Schumacker, Wielockx, Geschwind, Gilly, and De Groot, 
thereby bringing forward the integration within the EU.133 However, it is doubtful 
whether the ECJ will attach much legal significance to the Code of Conduct, not 
being a general rule adopted by the Community legislator. Legal form really 
seems to matter to the ECJ.134
                              
 
127 Letter State Secretary of Finance, 1.10.2007, no AFP2007-703, Vakstudie-Nieuws 2007/48.9. 
128 Paper Towards Tax Co-ordination in the European Union, COM(97) 495, 22.10.1996; a 
commitment to publish guidelines on the application of State aid was included.   
129 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to 
interest and royalty payments made between associated companies in different Member States, 
OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, 49, adapted by Council Directive 2004/66/EC, OJ L 168, 1.5.2004, 35.   
130 Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of 
interest payments, OJ L 157 26.6.2003, 38-48.  
131 Menéndez, “The Purse of the Polity, supra, n 28, 206.   
132 Recommendation 94/79/EC of 21 December 1993 on the taxation of certain items of income 
received by non-residents in a Member State other than that in which they are resident, OJ L 39, 
22-28. 
133 Case C-279/93, Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225; Case C-80/94 Wielockx, [1999]; Case C- 
336/96, Gilly [1998] ECR I-2793; Case C-391/97, Geschwind [1999] ECR-1-5451; and Case C-
385/00 De Groot, [2002] ECR I-11819. See Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, supra, n 5, 
391. 
134 Although the example of the Code of Conduct on public access to Commission and Council 
documents demonstrates that the ECJ is prepared to interpret quite broadly and boldly 
instruments in which the legal nature is not self-evident, I Österdahl, “The ECJ and Soft Law: 
Who’s Afraid of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter?”, in Mörth, Soft Law in Governance and 
Regulation, supra, n 69, 58. This Code of Conduct on public access to Commission and Council 
documents (93/730/EC; OJ 1993, L 340/41) soon developed into semi-hard law in the form of a 
Council decision on public access to Council documents, Decision 93/731/EC of 20 December 
1993, OJ 1993, L 340/43, and a Commission decision on public access to Commission 
documents, Decision 94/90ECSC, EC, Euratom, 8.2.1994, OJ 1994, L 46/58 respectively. 
Österdahl concludes (58): “One may wonder whether it is the legal form as such or the legal 
form merely as evidence of the presence or absence of a uniform political will that matters to the 
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 As mentioned above, the EC Court of Justice has struck down many national 
regulations which it qualified as a violation of the free movement rule (see supra, 
section B 3). The Court has removed many tax obstacles to cross-border 
activities. However, there are inherent limitations to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Unlike other European institutions, it cannot give positive guidance. The Court 
can merely tell Member States what not to do, but it cannot tell them what to do. 
Here, the Commission might give positive guidance with soft law in the form of 
interpretative instruments. In order to enable the Member States to overcome 
these difficulties, the Commission has offered to provide guidance on the 
implications of the Court’s case law for the Member States’ tax systems,135 as 
well as “to provide a forum for a co-ordinated response to individual court 
rulings.”136 Thus, the Commission has adopted a Communication announcing a 
series of initiatives to promote better co-ordination of national direct tax systems 
in the EU. The aim is to ensure that national tax systems comply with Community 
law and interact coherently with each other. These initiatives seek “to remove 
discrimination and double taxation for the benefit of individuals and business 
while preventing tax abuse and erosion of the tax base.”137  
 In passing, it may be noted that the hard impact of EU soft law is by no means 
an exception. It was already pointed out that the arm’s length principle received 
extra normative force because of its inclusion in article 9, para 1 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention and further elaboration in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (supra section 
C2). Thus, the OECD Recommendation on transfer pricing is implemented at the 
domestic level. Some countries have even codified the arm’s length principle 
accordingly in their corporate tax law, eg, the Netherlands (art 8b, para 1 
Corporation Income Tax Act 1969). The so-called “Commentaries on the Model 
Tax Convention” should also be mentioned. These Commentaries constitute 
recommendations issued by the OECD Council with the aim of stimulating 
Member Countries to follow the principles enshrined in the Guidelines referred 
 
ECJ.… [T]he ECJ will be careful not to apply a soft law instrument if it senses political 
controversy surrounding the instrument.”  
135 The Commission Company Tax Communication, Towards an Internal Market without Tax 
Obstacles, COM(2001) 582 final; see infra, section E 4.2  
136 M Aujean, “The Future of Non-Discrimination―Direct Taxation in Community Law”, in 
Avi-Jonah, Hines Jr, and Lang (eds), Comparative Fiscal Federalism, supra, n 17, 321-30, 329. 
He points to the difficulty that the ECJ cannot test the Community law compatibility of these 
soft law initiatives in advance of implementation. The ensuing uncertainties could perhaps be 
removed if the Commission (or the other institutions) were allowed to refer requests for 
preliminary rulings on the Community law compatibility of such initiatives to the Court.”   
137 Co-ordinating Member States Direct Tax Systems in the Internal Market, COM 
2006(823), One of these initiatives regards exit taxation; Exit taxation and the Need for Co-
ordination of Member States’ Tax Policies, COM(2006) 825 final. 
       Hans Gribnau 101
Legisprudence Vol II, No 2 
                            
to. These non-binding instruments do not lack legal value. Engelen holds that 
Commentaries on the Model tax Convention constitute a form of “elaborative soft 
law” that can be described as “principles that provide guidance to the 
interpretation, elaboration, or application of hard law”. 138 Such soft law reflects 
the consensus of the member countries as to the proper interpretation and 
application of the provisions of existing tax treaties that are based on the OECD 
Model Tax Convention (or other OECD soft law instruments), and in this way, it 
can be said, that hard and soft law are interdependent and the latter derives 
authority from, and extends the meaning of the former.139
 More generally, soft law providing international guidance and such non-legal 
instruments as codes of best practices, model legislation, and a set of governing 
principles, have appeared to be powerful instruments. States seeking to create 
new legal rules and policies often borrow from other states or internationally 
renowned experts. In environmental regulation, for example, the World Bank 
issued an internal operation manual in 1984 containing all kinds of instructions 
issued by the Office of Environmental Affairs, including a set of general policy 
principles, which gradually found its way into the legislation of many countries, 
sometimes after having been adopted in international conventions.140
 In conclusion, it can be stated that the relationship between soft law and hard 
law is a complicated affair and probably has an effect on relations between the 
EU institutions. Now I will proceed with a classification of EU soft law 
instruments. 
G. VARIETIES OF EU SOFT LAW 
A starting point for a classification should be the assessment of the possible use of 
the soft law instrument as an alternative to, or complement of, legislation. 
Therefore, a classification is best made on the basis of the function and objective 
of the various soft-law instruments. Notwithstanding the limitations of such a 
                              
138 He quotes Chinkin, “Normative Development in the International Legal System”, supra, 
n 106, 21-42, 30. 
139 Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, supra, n 102, 457-458. 
K Vogel, “Soft Law und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen”, in Lang, Schuch and Staringer, Soft 
Law in der Praxis, supra, n 66, 146. He observes: “Although the recommendations in most 
constitutions do not have direct (legal) effect, an exception to this rule is Norway, they are 
followed worldwide, not only by tax administrations and tax payers and their advisors, but also 
by courts.” (My translation). 
140 Slaughter, A New World Order?, supra, n 103, 179. 
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classification (as with every classification), it enables us to identify the different 
roles that soft-law instruments play in the Community’s legal order.141
 
1. Preparatory and informative instruments 
A first category of instruments which are usually considered soft law are the 
preparatory and informative instruments. This includes in particular Green 
Papers, White Papers, action programmes, and informative communications. 
These instruments do not communicate any (clear) guideline for behaviour. Their 
goal is to prepare further Community law and policy and/or provide information 
on Community action. Senden rightly questions whether these instruments 
actually constitute soft law at all. Not establishing any rules of conduct 
themselves, they only pave the way for adoption of future rules of conduct 
(legislation) “in the sense that they are an element in the assessment of their 
desirability or necessity and possible contents.” 142 As such, they can also be 
regarded as fulfilling a pre-law function, in the sense that they may facilitate the 
subsequent adoption of legislation by providing or increasing the basis of support 
for the rules contained therein.143
The already mentioned Ruding Committee Report is a famous example of a 
preparatory and informative instrument.144 The policy recommendations of this 
report did not have much impact. One possible reason for this failure was that the 
Ruding Committee’s proposals paid too much attention to the interests of the 
business community and did not sufficiently reflect the problems faced by the 
finance ministers.145
 The Monti paper should also be mentioned here. In 1996, Mr. Mario Monti 
introduced a new approach based on intensive consultation with the Council and 
the Member States. As said above, with this Memorandum, the Commission for 
the first time put the distorting effects of tax competition high on the political 
                              
141 For a categorisation of international soft law forms, see Chinkin, “Normative Development 
in the International Legal System”, supra, n 106, 30-31. 
142 Senden, “Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in European Law”, supra, n 87, 17. 
143 Ch E McLure, “Legislative, Judicial, and Soft Law Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate 
Income Taxes in the US and the EU” (2008) 14 Columbia Journal of European Law, section 1B 
and IVE.  According to Mc Lure, soft law, as that term is understood in the EC, does not exist in 
the US. “If law is not hard, it is not law.” Similarly, enhanced cooperation is a uniquely 
European concept that reflects constitutional and politically realities in the EC. However, 
cooperative approaches have long been employed in the effort to produce uniformity in state 
corporate taxation of income in the United States. These “initiatives are, for the most part, 
reasonably characterized as fulfilling a pre-law function.”  
144 Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation, Commission of the 
European Communities, supra, n 32.    
145 Cf Radaelli, “The Code of Conduct against Harmful Tax Competition”, supra, n 30, 518. 
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agenda.146 A few years later, the Commission set out its view in another 
informative instrument, the Communication entitled “Tax Policy in the European 
Union - Priorities for the Years Ahead.” 147 This Communication not only meant 
to stress the continuing importance of the fight against harmful tax competition, 
but also to ensure that tax policy is in line with the Lisbon goals, and thereby 
supports the continued success and development of the internal market and 
contributes to a durable reduction in the overall tax burden.148 In view of these 
goals, the Commission recommends certain general objectives for a future tax 
policy at Community level and identifies a number of specific priorities in the 
domains of direct and indirect taxation. Where the instruments for achieving these 
objectives are concerned, since unanimity remains the legal basis for decisions on 
taxation for the time being, the Commission also looks into the possibility of non-
legislative approaches or “soft legislation” in addition to legislation.149 Thus, the 
notion that ‘the use of non-legislative approaches or “soft legislation” could be 
seen as an additional means of making progress in the tax field’ became more 
widely accepted.150 It must be noted, however, that the Communication warns 
that the Commission will be strict in the application of the Treaty rules on State 
aid. Thus, hard law was used to convince the Member States to abide by the soft 
law agreed upon. 
 Another example of this first category of instruments is the Company 
Taxation Study, a Commission staff working paper.151 This study was 
accompanied by a Communication in which the Commission proposed to develop 
guidance on important ECJ rulings and to coordinate their implementation via 
appropriate Communications from the Commission.152 The Communication 
specifically mentioned the Verkooijen ruling153 on dividend taxation as important 
                              
146 Discussion paper for the international meeting of Ecofin Ministers, SEC(96) 487 final, 
20.3.1996. 
147 COM(2001) 260 final. 
148 It must also strengthen the economic, employment, health, and consumer protection and 
energy policies of the European Union. Furthermore, globalisation and vastly expanded trade 
and capital flows require Community policies which enhance rather than put at risk the EU's 
global competitiveness. 
149 Cf G Meussen, “The EU-Fight against Harmful Tax Competition; Future Developments” 
(2002) 11 EC Tax Review 159, on the suggestion of a European Union with a different speed of 
tax reform for leader Member States and Member States lagging behind. 
150 COM(2001) 260 final, 10 and 22-24. 
151 SEC(2001) 1681, “Company Taxation in the Internal Market”, a Commission staff working 
paper released on 23 October 2001, available on the Commission’s website at http://europa.eu. 
int/comm/taxation_customs/publications/official_doc/sec/sec.htm (last accessed on 7 December 
2007). 
152 The Commission Company Tax Communication, Towards an Internal Market without Tax 
Obstacles, COM(2001) 582 final. 
153 Case C-35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071. 
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for the design of Member States’ tax systems. All these instruments, a discussion 
paper, a study and a communication, do not establish any rules of conduct 
themselves; they are merely exploring and preparing the ground for future rules 
of conduct. 
2. Interpretative and decisional instruments 
A second category of soft-law instruments communicates standards of behaviour 
by way of interpretative and decisional instruments. These rules aim at providing 
guidance as to the interpretation and application of existing Community law, thus 
enhancing legal certainty, legal equality, and transparency. They are not intended 
to be legally binding. The line between interpretative and decisional instruments 
may appear blurred, as they are closely related. The interpretative instruments 
elucidate the existing body of rules, including the case law of the ECJ. As such, 
they restate or recapitulate the interpretation that should be given to Community 
law provisions. The decisional instruments, on the other hand, go further than 
mere interpretation. They indicate in what way a Community institution―usually 
the Commission―will apply Community law provisions in a particular case 
where it has implementing and discretionary powers. Thus, these implementing 
and discretionary powers are a precondition for these indications as to the way in 
which the institution will decide individual cases. As such, these instruments 
clearly communicate rules of conduct. 
 On the basis of the principle of legitimate expectations, for example, these 
instruments might even be legally binding on the Commission itself. Whether a 
soft law device has generated an expectation will depend upon its nature and 
wording.154 Thus, the hardening of these EU soft law instruments is possible (see 
also supra, section F 1). 
 Within this category fall the Commission's communications and notices and 
also certain guidelines, codes, and frameworks frequently adopted in the areas of 
competition law and State aid.155 These instruments bear resemblance to the 
administrative rules or policy rules that exist in quite a few national legal systems. 
They are usually not intended to substitute legislation, but rather to complement 
it. Hard and fast rules such as guidelines discipline the Commission itself (self-
                              
154 Cf Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law, supra, n 87, 440-442; S Schønberg, 
Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2000), 121; J Raitio, 
The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 
217; Aldestam, “Soft Law in the State Aid Policy Area”, supra, n 124, 11-36. 
155 A Evans, European Community Law of State Aid (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), 407. He 
argues that, after early legislative proposals in the area of State aid did not meet the Council’s 
approval, the Commission preferred to maintain a clear separation between its power and that of 
the Council and to rely on dialogue and consultation with Member States. Cf Cini, “The Soft 
Law Approach”, supra, n 23, 199.  
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binding). The resulting consistency in the application of the regulatory regime is 
of special importance in heavily politicized regulatory fields, like State aid.156 
Although issued by the Commission alone, Member States are consulted prior to 
the issuing of such soft law instruments (such as communications, notices and 
guidelines); they have the opportunity to comment on a draft of the relevant 
instrument at multilateral meetings held approximately four times a year.157
 An early example is the Commission’s Communication158 on the 
consequences of the judgment of the ECJ in Cassis de Dijon.159 Other examples 
are the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Dividend 
taxation of individuals in the Internal Market’.160 This communication might be 
considered a follow-up of the above-mentioned Communication161 in which the 
Commission proposed to develop guidance on important ECJ rulings and to 
coordinate their implementation. As stated in this Communication, “it provides 
guidance on the implications of Community law for Member States’ dividend 
taxation systems, to help Member States to ensure that their systems are 
compatible with the requirements of the Internal Market.” This Communication, 
thus, provides guidance as to the interpretation and application of existing 
Community law. The same goes for the Commission’s Notice on the application 
of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation.162 This 
Notice provides guidelines on the application of article 87 (former article 92) of 
the EC Treaty (State aid) in corporate tax matters. 
3. Steering instruments 
The third category contains what could be called―formal and non-
formal―steering instruments. The aim of these instruments is establishing or 
giving further effect to Community objectives and policy or related policy areas. 
Sometimes this is done in a rather political and declaratory way―in declarations 
and conclusions―but “often also with a view to establishing closer cooperation 
or even harmonisation between the Member States in a non-binding way, as 
                              
156 Cini, “The Soft Law Approach”, supra, n 23, 198-199, referring to Rawlinson.  
157 Cf Aldestam, “Soft Law in the State Aid Policy Area”, supra, n 124, 14. 
158 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission concerning 
the consequences of the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979, in Case 
120/78 (Cassis de Dijon), OJ 1980, C 256/2.  
159 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 
[1979] ECR 649. 
160 COM(2003) 810 final. 
161 COM(2001) 582 final. 
162 Commission Notice of 11 November 1998, press release No. IP/98/983. 
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occurs in particular in recommendations, resolutions and codes of conduct.” 163 
The recommendation constitutes a formal steering instrument; it is presented as a 
Community legal instrument in article 249 EC. The other instruments are non-
formal instruments. To a certain extent at least, they are used as alternatives to 
legislation.  
 The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation is a case in point. Besides being 
well known, the Code is a successful example of soft law in EU tax matters. The 
Code relies on peer pressure, which is political quite effective. It has also had a 
significant impact “on the related work of the OECD.” Thus, important negative 
integration was achieved through the Member States suspending application of 
the potentially harmful tax measures under scrutiny.  
 Another example is the Code of Conduct164 for the effective implementation 
of the Arbitration Convention.165 The aim of the Convention is the elimination of 
double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated 
enterprises and certain related issues of the mutual agreement procedure under 
double tax treaties between Member States. The Code of Conduct applies in cases 
where an EU Member State’s tax administration increases the taxable profits of a 
company from its cross-border intra-group transactions, for example, by making a 
transfer pricing adjustment. It should ensure a more effective and uniform 
application by all EU Member States of the 1990 Arbitration Convention 
(90/436/EEC) by establishing certain common procedures. The legally non-
binding character of the Code is nicely stated in the preamble: “Emphasising that 
the Code of Conduct is a political commitment and does not affect the Member 
States’ rights and obligations or the respective spheres of competence of the 
Member States and the Community resulting from the Treaty.” The same phrase 
was used in the preamble to the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation. 
 Having clarified the concept of soft law and the variety of soft law 
instruments, we may now turn to the legitimacy enhancing features of soft law. 
These features are closely connected to the more communicative style of 
regulation embodied by soft law, as will be shown in the next section. 
                              
163 Senden, “Soft Law, Self-regulation and Co-Regulation in European Law”, supra, n 87, 18. 
164 12695/2/04 REV 2, Brussels, 31.3.2005, FISC 173. 
165 Convention 90/436/EEC of 23.7.1990, OJ L 225 of 20.8.1990, 10. 
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H. SOFT LAW AND THE COMMUNICATIVE STYLE OF REGULATION 
1. The communicative style of regulation 
What is the conception of law which the use of soft law is founded on? Law is a 
means to communicate standards of behaviour.166 Legislation, and more 
generally, regulation, is often a statement, an announcement, about how people 
should behave. Thus, legal rules communicate normative standards, which lead to 
expectations of appropriate behaviour. Recently, this communicative function of 
law has become more predominant.167 Soft law fits particularly well into the 
concept of communicative law. This does not mean that the communicative 
dimension is the exclusive function of law. It is just one important aspect of law 
and law making, that is not to be ignored. 
 Consequently, a government can try to direct people’s actions either by means 
of clear and distinct directives, backed up with sanctions (fines or imprisonment), 
or by appealing in a less mandatory way (legally at least) to their need or wish to 
cooperate, their conscience, or their sense of decency. The first style of regulation 
(or broader: governance), the imperative one, is based on a hierarchical and one-
way model of communication: a superior (the state) gives a clear-cut command 
(the law) to its subordinates (the people), who are expected to obey and who are 
punished if they do not. This is the traditional command and control method of 
regulation. This system of command and control is characterized by “the 
domination of hierarchy and monopoly for rule setters.” 168  
 The second one, the communicative style of regulation, on the contrary, relies 
on persuasion rather than punishment. It takes regulation more as an invitation to 
a dialogue between more or less equal parties: state officials (including the 
executive, public prosecutors, judges, etc), intermediary organisations, and 
citizens.169 Therefore, the legislator does not intervene directly in social reality, 
but lays down “in the law a fundamental value (for example, equality) in order to 
promote a gradual change in attitude and behaviour within the legal 
community.”170 Such a precondition of a common value is not always met. More 
                              
166 As M Van Hoecke, Law as Communication (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002), 10, reminds us: 
“Law is communication, and not only about differing forms of interhuman communications.” 
(Emphasis in original). 
167 See W Witteveen and B van Klink, “Why Is Soft Law Really Law? A Communicative 
Approach to Legislation” 14 (1999) RegelMaat 3 126-140. Cf W Witteveen, “Turning to 
Communication in the Study of Legislation”, in N Zeegers, W Witteveen and B van Klink (eds), 
Social and Symbolic Effects of Legislation under the Rule of Law (Lewiston, The Edwin Mellen 
Press, 2005), 17-44.  
168 Mörth “Introduction”, supra, n 69, 1. 
169 Witteveen and Van Klink, “Why Is Soft Law Really Law?”, supra, n 167, 126. 
170 Ibid, 127. 
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or less agreement on a fundamental value may be present. However, it may also 
be diffuse or even non-existent as a resource for joint problem-solving. “The 
coordinative force of problem-solving―its ability to harmonize action―should 
therefore be sought for in the process itself, in the process of finding efficient or 
right solutions.”171 Even so, a rule may contain a norm which has to be fleshed 
out by a regulatory agency and the citizens addressed by this norm.172 As said 
above, government and its agencies are partly dependent upon data, information, 
and documents provided by civil society. To make the best regulations possible, 
regulatory agencies are dependent upon the expertise of stakeholders. Meeting the 
needs of the people cannot but involve the people themselves in order to 
exchange resources and negotiated shared purposes, problems, and solutions. 
Formulating and solving public problems which have become too complex for a 
government to handle on its own cannot but be a matter of collaboration between 
public agencies and civil society. 
 Communicative regulation, therefore, depends on reciprocal interaction rather 
than on unilateral commands, the former being better capable of responding to the 
expectations, interests, and preferences of a community. As such, it enables the 
establishment of a community of discourse, which might be labelled as an 
indicator of convergence in “talk.”173
The participants in the dialogue form an interpretative community, with a 
subsequent discursive practice which allows for the shaping and reshaping of 
attitudes, the establishment of a common vocabulary, and the coordination of 
action.174 A common vocabulary and mutual trust are the basis for productive 
communication. This does not occur automatically; on the contrary, it often 
results from cautious communicative steps. Moreover, the discursive practice is 
often a matter of trial and error. Success and progress are not guaranteed. An 
effective dialogue between the participants in a discursive practice may lead to 
compromise or even consensus which enables joint decision-making and acting.  
 Of course, these two styles of regulation are not mutually exclusive. 
Depending on the context, a government may, in one case, opt for a more 
imperative regulation and for the more communicative style of soft law in 
another. 
                              
171 Eriksen, “Reflexive Integration in the EU”, supra, n 70, 15. 
172 Gribnau, “Soft Law and Taxation”, supra, n 2, 308-312 with regard to administrative rule-
making. The consultation and participation of taxpayers often improves user-friendliness and 
reduces the administrative burden of administrative rules. 
173 For a plea to make a stronger distinction than hitherto between convergence talk, 
convergence decision, and convergence action, recognizing the fact that divergences frequently 
develop between talk (debate), decisions and actions (which should not be regarded in a purely 
negative way), see C Pollitt, “Convergence: The Useful Myth?” (2001) 79 Public 
Administration 938. 
174 Witteveen and Van Klink, “Why Is Soft Law Really Law?”, supra, n 167,128-129. 
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 The first, imperative―command and control―style of regulation is well-
known in European tax law. Frequently used legislative instruments such as 
regulations and directives have legally binding force. These forms of Community 
secondary legislation both have a general scope. Regulations and directives are 
often used in tax matters to establish positive integration, especially 
harmonization of indirect taxes. Well-known examples are the adoption of 
(Council) Regulation 2913/92, introducing the Community Customs Code, and 
the Sixth VAT Directive (77/388/EC). 
 However, this traditional command and control mode of regulation is based on 
binding and uniform legislation, and is not always useful or appropriate, for 
example, in those areas where the interests and preferences of the Member States 
are less convergent. This is the case with the harmonization of direct taxes, which 
is generally regarded as a politically highly sensitive area. This is not surprising, 
since taxation is a fundamental sign of national sovereignty. Apart from that, in 
the regulatory welfare state, taxation has become a very important instrument of 
national governments for wide-scale social, economic, cultural, and even 
environmental policies. Therefore, national tax preferences have sufficiently high 
political salience to prevent agreement on strictly uniform European tax policies. 
 Consequently, the European the Commission has filled the gap with soft law: 
non-binding norms are used to supplement or substitute legally binding 
obligations with increasing frequency. Of course, soft law instruments may also 
be used to facilitate and stimulate the gradual evolution of the consensus required 
for the establishment of new (hard) legislation.175
 Soft law clearly is an example of this communicative style of regulation. It 
may lay down a fundamental value, but not necessarily so. In economic matters, 
for example, it may define general terms or a list of criteria or concepts to 
promote further debate and change in behaviour. The Code of Conduct for 
Business Taxation is a case in point. It defines harmful tax competition in general 
terms and provides a list of criteria to define the harmful characteristics of tax 
competition. The common definition, vocabulary, and concepts provided enabled 
a community of discourse to emerge; shared tax policy beliefs and norms about 
“good” and “bad” tax competition were established.176 Thus, a dialogue came 
about between the Member States, resulting in some commitment and a degree of 
consensus within the interpretative community with a shared vocabulary. To be 
                              
175 Shelton, “Introduction”, supra, n 111, 32. For a critical review of the assumptions underlying 
the idea of consensus, which is a hallmark of governance, see P Westerman, “Governing by 
Goals”, 59-61. 
176 Radaelli, “The Code of Conduct against Harmful Tax Competition”, supra, n 30, 522-523. 
Other soft-law instruments, such as interpretative and decisional instruments, providing 
guidance as to the interpretation and application of existing Community law, and thus  
enhancing legal certainty and equality, may also be based on a collaboration with the relevant 
stakeholders. 
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sure, an interpretative community does not “mean total agreement, but instead 
commitment to share a ‘communicative framework’.”177 There is room for 
different deep substantive convictions as long as the participants agree on how to 
cope with differences in these convictions. To be sure, the dialogue will not 
always be conducted rationally and fairly, antagonism being inherent to the 
conflicting power to tax of the Member States, for after all it is about the 
allocation of tax revenue.  
 Put in slightly other words, “socialisation” emerged as a consequence of this 
mode of governance, socialisation developing “patterns of trust, and multilateral 
understandings that provide the essential mechanisms” through which the Code of 
Conduct operates.178 The shared beliefs in this highly technical network of 
corporate tax specialists was another important factor in the process of 
socialisation. These factors enabled peer review in the Primarolo group, a specific 
new governance solution. Thus, socialisation brought about a form of tax 
coordination in EU bodies dedicated to direct taxation. Although, historically 
there has been more socialisation in the OECD, “the situation has changed since 
1997”.179
 This socialisation existed mainly in convergence of talk. An important 
element of this convergence in “talk” is the peer review of potentially harmful 
characteristics of tax measures in which arguments, mutual adjustment, and 
persuasion play an important role (see supra, section D). 
 Communicative instruments are used in order to promote a gradual change in 
attitude and behaviour within the legal community by way of cooperative 
processes, for example, when there is little prospect of reaching unanimity. 
However, real success, ie, convergence in actual practice and in results, is not 
guaranteed. As for the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, convergence 
remains limited (cf the changes in the Netherlands’ intermediate royalty and 
interest entities advance pricing agreement and advance ruling practices).180 
                              
 
177 M Minow, Making All the Difference. Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press, 1990), 294.  Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, supra, n 
1, 280: In “a slow but well-sustained progress, the effect of each step is watched” and in this 
process “we compensate, we reconcile, we balance.”   
178 C M Radaelli and U S Kraemer, Final Project Report, ref no 22D/10, New Modes of 
Government Project, Priority 7―Citizens and Governance in the Knowledge-based Society, 
June 2007, <http://www.eu-newgov.org/database/DELIV/D22D10_Final_Project_Report.pdf>, 
5 (last accessed on 7 December 2007). 
179 Radaelli en Kraemer, Final Project Report, supra, n 178, 6. 
180 The use of soft law may have an impact, but compliance with soft law is not an unqualified 
success story. This also goes for other EU policy fields. G Falkner, Complying with Europe; EU 
Harmonisation and Soft Law in the Member States (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 199, 
conclude, on the basis of ninety-one implementation studies in the field of working conditions, 
which are addressed by the EU’s social policy measures, that the view that only binding law has 
the potential to harmonise the different domestic working conditions does not hold for the large 
       Hans Gribnau 111
Legisprudence Vol II, No 2 
                                                                                                                                   
Member States continue to compete with each other in order to attract economic 
activity, and try to innovate their corporate tax systems in order to attract business 
with “unique selling points”. The “plasticity of taxes” is an important factor 
here.181 Tax incentives and privileges may take very refined and not easy to detect 
forms.  
 Therefore, it is still mainly convergence in concepts, beliefs, and norms. 
Consequently, there “is more convergence in ‘talk’ and (to some extent) EU-level 
decisions than in domestic implementation and policy results.”182 Still, there 
seems to be a difference between compliance with rules of conduct voluntarily 
agreed upon and rules of conduct laid down in the case law of the ECJ. Member 
States’ compliance with voluntary agreements such the Code of Conduct, may be 
limited but this form of self-binding nonetheless generates a more positive 
attitude. Member States are more inclined to comply with standards of conduct 
agreed upon than with judgments imposed upon them by the ECJ.183 “EU 
Member States typically limit ECJ interference with the content of European 
rights and obligations by containing their compliance: national administrations 
obey individual ECJ judgments and simultaneously ignore the implications that 
unwelcome judicial interpretation has for the universe of parallel situations.”184 In 
the case of self-regulation based on codes of conduct, Member States are more 
committed to the standards of conduct bargained about, than to Court rulings, 
based on one single case and merely telling Member States what not to do. The 
Code of Conduct shows that Member States “take their obligations with regard to 
the Common market more seriously.”185
 
majority of cases. Neither does soft law come close to hard law in its effects: the carrots of 
“learning processes” and the sticks of “naming and shaming” (a “soft form of harmonisation”) 
do not drive Member States to go with the recommended practices, ie, to follow the EU’s 
recommendations systematically and transform them into hard domestic provisions, or even go 
beyond these recommendations and uphold standards beyond the required minimum. 
181 G Casado Ollero, “The Community Legal System and the Internal Tax System”, in A 
Amatucci (ed), International Tax Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2006), 
376. 
182 Radaelli, “The Code of Conduct against Harmful Tax Competition”, supra, n 30, 528.  
183 Here, the theory of “rational institutionalism” might be of interest. It points out that it most 
cases the participants’ interests and motives for co-operation are mixed. Besides the interest in 
the short-term maximization of individual gains, future considerations might also make actors 
cautious in a way that does not endanger co-operative outcomes, see M Zürn, “Introduction: 
Law and Compliance at Different Levels”, in M Zürn and Ch Joerges (eds), Law and 
Governance in Postnational Europe: Compliance Beyond the Nation-State (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 20. 
184 L Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 3. 
185 Kiekebeld, Harmful Tax Competition in the European Union, supra, n 55, 137. 
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 However, as already mentioned that dialogue between members of an 
interpretative community is not a linear process of progress without backlash. 
Stagnation and even decline may occur, as the fate of the Code of Conduct shows. 
It has been quite an effective political instrument but its future effects are 
uncertain. On the basis of an in-depth study with consultation of different 
stakeholders and experts, Radaelli and Kraemer conclude that the “code is already 
considered an experience of the past.”186 However, some experts argue that the 
future of the Code may lie in the technical analysis of standstill, thereby making 
sure that Member States notify potential harmful regimes and accept subjecting 
these to peer review. There is not much political momentum here, for the “level of 
participants in the group chaired by Dawn Primarolo has gone down, from high 
level tax authorities, often the same people who would accompany their ministers 
at ECOFIN, to less important figures.”187 Nonetheless, the Code of Conduct had 
an impact, in any case in terms of the socialization processes within the Primarolo 
group. 
 The Code of Conduct can, therefore, be seen as typical of a communicative 
approach: European soft law has “a persuasive and constructive role in the 
formulation and execution of the policies of the Union.”188 Such a step by step 
soft law approach will be more effective in securing support among the Member 
States and citizens for EU tax policies than top-down legislation, enhancing the 
legitimacy of the Community actions. At the same time, this rulemaking and 
communication of standards of behaviour, by reciprocal commitment, will 
improve voluntary compliance. The policy will have more actual impact, and will 
be more successful. More effectiveness in achieving the policy goals will in its 
turn enhance legitimacy, because it is “necessary not only for the sake of 
efficiency of the internal market but also to strengthen the credibility of the Union 
and its Institutions.”189 Obviously, this credibility is linked with the improvement 
of the Community’s legitimacy. 
 In conclusion, it can be stated that the use of soft law may be suitable as a 
supplement or even an alternative to legislation, thus improving the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of policies and regulative processes. But in what ways could the 
communicative quality of soft law be enhanced? Here, public participation and 
consultation spring to mind. The EU already acknowledges their importance as a 
                              
186 Radaelli and Kraemer, Final Project Report, supra, n 178, 9.  
187 Ibid, 19. They point to the direct involvement of EU commissioner Monti in the fight against 
harmful tax competition. Bolkestein his successor, showed far less involvement: “It was a fact 
that taxation was not one of his priorities.” Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that Bolkestein 
initiated the so-called Common Consolidated Tax Base project, a form of positive integration 
(supra, section B3).  
188 R Baldwin, Rules and Government (Oxford University Press, 1995), 226. 
189 COM(2001) 428 final, 5. 
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means to promote the legitimacy of community action, as will be shown in the 
next section. 
2. Public consultation and participation and EU soft law  
Soft law instruments may concretise, specify, and clarify formal EU legislation. 
Soft law may also prepare the ground for, supplement, or reinforce hard law. This 
fits in well with the new Community method of policy and rule-making, part of 
which is guided by the aim to set legislation on “a more general or abstract level, 
providing a framework for implementation, rather than becoming embroiled in 
the detail.”190 Policies and rules may subsequently be (further) elaborated via 
communicative practices. 
 In order the formulate policies which meet the needs of the people, citizens, 
interest groups, networks, and experts are needed to furnish information. Thus, 
the EU institutions are enabled to respond efficiently and effectively to the 
expectations, interests, and needs of the people. Better policies and rules enhance 
the output legitimacy of the EU and its institutions. However, in the decision-
making process, the quality of procedures is also of importance. Public 
participation may serve to enhance this input legitimacy.191 Participation should 
be “inclusive”, ie, the people affected by the policy or rule to be established 
should be enabled to participate.192 That is to say, the degree to which those 
affected (the stakeholders) have been included in the decision-making processes 
and have had the opportunity to influence the outcome (“inclusiveness”) 
contributes to the input legitimacy.193 It was shown in section E2 that the 
Commission explicitly acknowledges this mode of governance. “The Union ... 
will no longer be judged solely by its ability to remove barriers to trade or to 
complete an internal market; its legitimacy today depends on involvement and 
participation.”194 This fits in well with the idea that government cannot do 
without the engagement of the citizens. Good government, viz, accountable, 
                              
190 D Wincott, “The Governance White Paper, the Commission and the Search for Legitimacy”, 
in A Arnull and D Wincott (eds), Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 389. See COM(2001) 428 final, 20. 
191 See J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy, W Regh (tr) (Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1996), 228-229. For an in-depth 
discussion of participation mechanisms in another field of European law, see J M Verschuuren, 
“Public Participation Regarding the Elaboration and Approval of Projects in the EU after the 
Aarhus Convention”, in T F M Etty et al (eds), Yearbook of European Environmental Law, 
Volume 4 (Oxford University Press, 2005), 29-48. 
192 I M Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000), 5. 
193 This input legitimacy depends on communicative interaction with the citizens in the pre-
decision-making stage and at the stage of the decision-making itself. See Gribnau, “Improving 
the Legitimacy of Soft Law in EU Tax Law”, supra, n 186, 38.  
194 COM(2001) 428 final, 11. 
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effective, and legitimate government, requires substantial civic and political 
engagement “by the people themselves.”195 What is more, public participation 
contributes to self-government, instead of bureaucratic rule from a remote 
centre―a kind of “government by strangers”―and improves responsiveness and 
legitimacy.196 In my opinion, public participation should not only concern the 
decision- or rule-making process (“agenda setting” included197), but also the 
evaluative assessment of a decision or a rule once adopted. Public participation is 
a useful instrument for improvement, taking into account the pros and cons 
experienced by citizens and enterprises in daily practice. 
 The EU has put communication of stakeholders by way of consultation high 
on the political agenda. The White Paper on European Governance states that the 
“Commission already consults interested parties through different instruments, 
such as Green and White Papers, Communications, advisory committees, 
business test panels and ad hoc consultations.”198 Furthermore, on-line 
consultation through the interactive policy-making initiative has been 
developed.199 Evidently, such consultation of stakeholders helps the Commission 
and the other EU institutions to arbitrate between competing claims and priorities. 
Here, guarantees should be built in order to enable the equal expression of all 
perspectives and to neutralize “the ability of powerful interests to distort 
discussion.”200 Because of the often enormous lobbying capacity of multinational 
enterprises, countervailing access to deliberations of EU institutions on the part of 
other groups and interests may be helpful.201 Consultation may thus not only be a 
matter of finding solutions for urgent problems and developing short-term 
policies, but also of developing a longer term policy perspective. Therefore, 
“participation is about more effective policy shaping based on early consultation 
and past experience.” 202
                              
195 S Macedo ea, Democracy at Risk (Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 13. 
196 L Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London, The Penguin Press, 2001), 4, referring to 
Montesquieu.  
197 On the importance of agenda setting, B Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1984), 181: “What counts as an ‘issue’ or a ‘problem’ and how such issues and 
problems are formulated may to a large extent predetermine what decisions are reached.” 
198 See < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/consultation_en.pdf > (last accessed 
25 January 2008). 
199 See < http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/6541> (last accessed 25 January 2008). 
200 I Young, “Difference as a Resource”, in D Estlund (ed), Democracy (Oxford, Blackwell 
Publishing, 2002), 228.  
201 P T Muchlinsky, “‘Global Bukowina’ Examined: Viewing the Multinational enterprise as a 
Transnational Law-Making Community”, in G Teubner (ed), Global Law without State 
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enterprises. 
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 ICT is thus recognised as an important instrument in the field of consultation 
which may enhance the communicative quality of EU policy-making processes. 
The Commission hopes that businesses, consumers, and citizens will use 
Interactive Policy Making (IPM) and similar Internet-based tools as an additional 
means of evaluating existing EU policies and of conducting consultations on new 
initiatives, and wherever possible, to help the Commission to respond faster and 
more accurately to their needs.203 Consultations are already being conducted in 
tax matters, eg, the Consultation on Home State Taxation for SMEs (closed on 31 
December 2004), the Consultation on proposals for passenger car taxation (closed 
on 11 September 2004), and the Consultation on Modernising the Value Added 
Tax.204
 Of course public consultation and participation will seldom produce 
unequivocal conclusions and solutions, because of the conflicting needs and 
interests of the participants (and non- participants). Consultation, therefore, does 
not reduce the role of Community institutions to merely monitoring the process. 
They should do their best to protect general interests “in a world which seems to 
be disintegrating into sub-interests.”205 They should use their right to decide and 
intervene. The primacy of politics, therefore, should not be ignored. In the end, 
the representation of certain interests cannot replace political representation.206 
This does not mean that Community institutions should claim the exclusive right 
to establish the general interest by themselves. They should this in collaboration 
with civil society, adopting a communicative and learning attitude. 
 This kind of public participation by stakeholders and interested parties may 
improve the feasibility and practicability of soft rules. Thus civil society plays an 
important role in shaping policies. This form “inclusive governance” accounts for 
civil society as a potential participant in democratic experimentalism, civil 
society not remaining outside governance, as an abstract idealisation, but, on the 
contrary, being brought “directly into governance as a concrete political and legal 
                              
203 To take the example of the CCCTB project (supra, section B3), much work is being done by 
the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, in which experts from all 27 
Member States and the Commission Services participate. The group has approximately four 
meetings a year. Working documents for discussion in meetings of the working group are 
published on a website shortly after each meeting. In many cases, the documents include a series 
of questions and comments and contributions from interested parties. Written contributions 
received from several organisations are available on the website, in their original language. 
204 For an overview, see <http://ec.europa.eu.int/taxation_customs/consultations/tax/indes_en. 
htm> (last accessed 25 January 2008). The overview also indicates target groups, eg, trader, 
business, “public”. 
205 B M J van Klink and J E J  Prins (eds), Law and Regulation: Scenarios for the Information 
Age (Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2002), 96. 
206 Cf A Verhoeven, “Democratic Life in the European Union, According to its Constitution”, in 
Curtin and  Wessel, Good Governance and the European Union, supra, n 80, 170. 
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actor.”207 To be sure, it is not just about a communication of discourse in which 
governments are participating. Turning back to the Code of Conduct for Business 
Taxation, it must be pointed out that civil society is hardly involved. The Code of 
Conduct therefore, is not a good example of participatory governance, since only 
governments are participating.208 The managing of the Code by high-level tax-
policy makers (the Primarolo group) is a matter of informal governance, but not 
inclusive governance. Business representatives and other non-governmental 
actors such as employers’ confederations and think tanks “have so far remained 
outsiders in the deliberation concerning the code.”209 Here, the principle of 
publicity should also be mentioned. Publicity lies at the heart of communicative 
policy-making and regulation. It “encourages citizens to deliberate about public 
policy and enables officials to learn about and from public opinion.”210 With 
regard to the Code of Conduct, stakeholders have hardly gained any insight into 
the considerations and arguments underlying the decisions of the Primarolo 
group, its meetings taking place away from public scrutiny. Therefore, a public 
and informed debate, depending on publicity, was hardly possible. 
Consequently, the Code, managed in secret, does not score well in terms of 
transparency and input legitimacy and perhaps even output legitimacy may be 
affected. To conclude this section, the involvement of civil society in policy and 
rule-making by way of communicative practices and such public participation and 
consultation of stakeholders may improve the quality of soft law. Even so, 
consultation of social actors, such as individuals and companies, creates a social 
basis of the implementation and application of tax laws and attributes to the 
effectiveness and responsiveness of EU tax regulations. Thus, output legitimacy 
will be enhanced. At the same time, public participation promotes input 
legitimacy, contributing to a more communicative style of rule making, 
depending on reciprocal interaction instead of unilaterally established rules.211
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I.  CONCLUSION 
The EU increasingly uses diversified (new) governance mechanisms in order to 
improve its performance and legitimacy. In tax matters, various kinds of soft law 
are used, in indirect taxation as well as in direct taxation. One such instrument, 
the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, is deployed to tackle harmful tax 
competition with respect to direct taxation. In this field of direct taxes, the 
unanimity requirement has been a serious impediment to harmonisation, because 
Member States treasure their tax sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Code’s adoption 
marked an important step towards (further) tax coordination. The political 
commitment to tax coordination was translated into peer review, which stimulated 
the Member States to take the Code seriously; they subsequently amended most 
of their harmful tax measures. There is a subtle interplay between the Code of 
Conduct and existing hard law in the EU, the State aid provisions playing an 
important role. Furthermore, the Code and the OECD’s soft law instruments 
reinforce each other. Though the Code’s effectiveness is limited, producing 
negative integration only, it still is significant in facilitating an ongoing dialogue 
on harmful tax competition between the Member States.  
 The new governance approach fosters a dialogue between EU agencies and 
stakeholders, non-hierarchical communication being an essential condition for 
taking Europe’s citizens seriously. The communicative quality of soft policy-
making and regulation may be enhanced by involving stakeholders by way of 
consultation and participation. The Code of Conduct, however, does not score 
well in terms of this kind of communication with stakeholders, and therefore in 
terms of legitimacy and transparency: the Member States are involved, not civil 
society. More inclusive and transparent participation and consultation should be 
at the heart of EU policy-shaping. This will enhance the responsiveness and 
legitimacy of EU policies, regulations, and institutions.  
  
